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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the post-2003 temporary return migration of highly skilled Iraqi 
expatriates to their home country. It aims to highlight the diverse opportunities, motivations, 
expectations and goals within the Iraqi diaspora. These differences are based not only on 
religious, ethnic, gendered and socio-economic factors, but also on the particular experience of 
emigration from the 1950s to today and the opportunity structures available in various host 
countries. By studying Iraqi expatriates who have returned to Iraq temporarily to work on a 
consultancy level or for other professional reasons, this research shows the importance of these 
divisions, and the impact they have on development projects that recruit members of the Iraqi 
diaspora. 
 
 
 
Kurzfassung 
Die vorliegende Masterarbeit befasst sich mit der temporären Rückkehr hochqualifizierter 
irakischer EmigrantInnen in ihr Heimatland nach 2003. Sie beleuchtet die unterschiedlichen 
Möglichkeiten, Motivationen, Erwartungen und Ziele innerhalb der irakischen Diaspora. Diese 
Unterschiede sind nicht nur auf religiöse, ethnische, Gender- und sozioökonomische Faktoren 
zurückzuführen, sondern auch auf die spezifische Emigrationserfahrung seit den 1950er Jahren 
bis heute und auf die in den einzelnen Aufnahmeländern vorhandenen Chancen. Durch die 
Beforschung irakischer EmigrantInnen, die für begrenzte Zeit in den Irak zurückgekehrt sind, um 
als BeraterInnen oder in anderen beruflichen Feldern zu arbeiten, kann diese Studie die 
Wichtigkeit dieser Unterschiede und deren Auswirkung auf Entwicklungsprojekte, die Mitglieder 
der irakischen Diaspora rekrutieren, aufzeigen. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Question 
―Here is safety, we have everything available. But Iraq is home.‖1 This quote from an Iraqi 
Christian woman now living in the U.S. demonstrates the complex emotions of Iraqis abroad. 
Many feel strongly Iraqi, and long for a stable Iraq to which they can return. But there is the 
realization among many that this will not be possible during their lifetime, due to the current 
volatile situation. On the other hand, there has been a limited amount of temporary return and 
engagement with Iraq after the end of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. So then the question 
begs to be answered: Why do some Iraqis return to Iraq? Furthermore, what are the 
opportunities, motivations and expectations for this return? 
Only Iraqi Kurdistan is fairly stable, and Amman and Damascus, along with other centers 
of Iraqi communities abroad, serve as meeting points for Iraqis around the world. From these 
hubs, Iraqis are able to engage in multiple ways with their home country, whether it is to 
reconnect with family members, to work on rebuilding schools, or to maintain their businesses in 
Iraq. Current Iraqi returnees can be broken down into two groups: permanent and temporary 
return migrants. The first group consists primarily of recent post-2003 refugees returning 
permanently because of limited opportunities abroad and/or they have run out of savings. The 
second group returns to work in Iraq or visit family in the country for a limited period of time, 
while continuing to live abroad. Within this temporary return migration pattern, there are a 
number of Iraqis returning as consultants on development programs or to maintain businesses in 
Iraq. This group is the main focus of this thesis, as there may be an important developmental 
impact from the return of these Iraqis. This group is generally tertiary-educated, and they also 
tend to have access to more state of the art facilities, as well as more up-to-date skills and 
technical knowledge that many of the Iraqi population do not have. Therefore, harnessing their 
potential could help fuel development in Iraq. On the other hand, when these Iraqis are recruited 
for participation in development programs, their background—ethnic, religious, gendered, and 
socio-economic—can affect the role they play within these programs, and therefore influence the 
                                                 
1
 Personal Interview, 3 March 2010. A quote from a Christian Iraqi woman now living in the U.S. To preserve 
anonymity, the names of all interviewees have been omitted. 
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impact of these programs. Therefore, the temporary return migration of these highly skilled 
Iraqis should be studied, to determine the effect their return may have on development in Iraq. 
 This thesis is a foray into this suggestion, aiming to highlight the diverse opportunities, 
motivations, expectations and goals within the Iraqi diaspora and more specifically among those 
who return temporarily for professional reasons. It does this by studying not only the religious, 
ethnic, gendered and socio-economic differences within the diaspora, but also divisions based on 
the particular experiences of emigration and the opportunity structures available in various host 
countries. These differences impact the interactions between these temporary return migrants and 
other actors, especially Iraqis in Iraq. In fact, there seems to be a disconnect between returning 
Iraqi expatriates and Iraqi society. Many local Iraqis resent those who have spent most of their 
life abroad and are now returning to work at higher levels, at a higher pay and for a limited time 
period. This can hinder the effectiveness of development programs, and so should be recognized 
and dealt with within these programs. Due to this disconnect, it is important to concentrate on the 
diverse backgrounds that guide the reasons for emigration, as well as the motivations and 
opportunities available for temporary return migration. These in turn interact with the agents 
involved: other Iraqi migrants, the people in Iraq, the Iraqi government and external actors, such 
as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the U.S. government. By studying Iraqi 
expatriates who have returned to Iraq temporarily to work on a consultancy level or for other 
professional reasons, this research shows the importance of these divisions, and the impact they 
can have on development projects that recruit members of the Iraqi diaspora. 
 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
This thesis will proceed in several steps: I will first outline the methodology for my case study. 
Next I will define key terms used within the thesis and elaborate the theoretical framework, 
emphasizing the migration-development nexus, as well as network theory and transnationalism. 
Then, a brief outline is presented of the current state of the country, followed by a chapter on the 
circumstances surrounding various waves of Iraqi emigration. The conditions for Iraqi migration 
are strategic to how different communities feel towards Iraq, and especially their desire to return. 
This is followed by a chapter focusing on the various trajectories of Iraqi migration, which are a 
function of the particular networks and opportunity structures to which different migrants 
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belong. This chapter studies the characteristics of Iraqi communities in five host countries: the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Iran, Syria and Jordan. The communities in these countries 
have a specific composition and form of interaction with both their hosts and Iraq, which also 
influences their activities and their perception of Iraq. 
Finally, I examine specific examples of temporary return. This includes analysis of the 
model of institutionally organized consultancies, two development programs that recruited Iraqi 
expatriates (the Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq Programme coordinated by UNDP, IOM and the Iraqi 
Government; and the Local Governance Program of USAID and local Iraqi governments), and 
the concept of ―re-engagement‖ as proposed by Geraldine Chatelard, a leading scholar of Iraqi 
migration. These examples were chosen based on the literature available and the relevance for 
developmental impact. Throughout this chapter, feedback from interviews is used to highlight 
the varied experiences of expatriates returning to Iraq. The last chapter concludes, bringing 
together the findings of the study and suggestions for future research. 
 
1.3 Research Methods 
The objective of this study is to examine the multiple motivations and expectations guiding 
return within an expatriate community, and how these differences may affect development. It 
was decided to adopt a single case study in order to focus on a specific problem in greater detail, 
taking into account the country's specific context. Iraq was chosen because there has been little 
study to date on the unique and diverse transnational communities that have been created over 
the years and the multiple ways they interact with each other and Iraq. For this study, I relied 
primarily on qualitative methods. 
First, I conducted research into transnational migration and the migration-development 
nexus (See Chapter 2). This helped illuminate theoretical explanations for how and why people 
migrate and the impact on development, as well as how and why people return, especially the 
drivers and the impacts. To get a general picture of the Iraqi diaspora, I also conducted a review 
of literature on the various Iraqi communities abroad and Iraqi migration. This consisted of 
collecting information from governmental (Iraq, U.K., U.S., Syria, Jordan) sources, organization 
or private (IOM, MPI, UNHCR, UNDP) sources and academic reports. This review included 
research on the numbers of migrants, the different waves of migration (which reflect both 
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political and economic difficulties in Iraq as well as opportunities available abroad), the different 
forms of interaction with Iraq, and the opportunities for return migration. 
 This literature research is buttressed by ten semi-structured informal interviews focused 
on oral historical responses, using open-ended questions to allow both the interviewer and the 
interviewee to focus on particular points as the interview developed.
2
 These interviews were 
conducted individually with each subject, from February to September 2010, with Iraqis living 
abroad who had made one or multiple return trips to Iraq in the preceding two years. Three 
interviews were not recorded with a recording device, but all interviews were transcribed. 
Interviews were chosen to complement the existing literature with the supposition that individual 
experiences could illuminate various motivations and goals present among those expatriates who 
had returned to Iraq recently, either on a temporary or permanent
3
 basis. The interviews focused 
on the subjects‘ reasons for return, their experiences while in Iraq and their opinions about the 
future development of the country. To encourage a more open discussion of the interviewee‘s 
experience, each interviewee was reminded that they would remain anonymous in this study.   
These interviewees were selected opportunistically, relying on personal contacts from 
family, friends and academic relationships at the University of Vienna. Because of this, there is 
an important limitation to the conclusions I can draw from these interviews. My family is 
Christian Iraqi, a very small minority in Iraq, and most interviews I conducted of family 
members or through family connections were with Christians (four out of the five). My family‘s 
background provides both unique insight and limits to my understanding of the Iraqi diaspora. 
They are Christian Iraqis who left Iraq from the mid 1970s until the mid 1990s, emigration 
caused by a mixture of economic reasons and persecution under Saddam Hussein. However, two 
of the Christian Iraqi interviewees contacted through family connections left in 2009. Due to 
their specific history of persecution and socioeconomic background, their input is limited to a 
small percent of the Iraqi population. Christians are overrepresented in the diaspora, so these 
interviewees may be representative of the feelings of a large section of the Iraqi diaspora, but 
they may not represent the majority. Furthermore, the interviews I had with Iraqis who had 
settled in Austria and had returned were only with Kurds, also overrepresented in the diaspora. 
                                                 
2
 For more on interview methods, see Harvey Russel Bernard (2000), Social Research Methods: Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
3
 However, only one permanent returnee was interviewed. See Table 1 in Annex. 
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Due to the overrepresentation of these communities in the diaspora, these interviews may be 
representative of the attitudes of a large section of the community abroad, but they may not 
represent those currently living in Iraq, or even the majority of the Christian or Kurdish Iraqi 
communities abroad. In the best of all possible worlds, I would have been able to sample a larger 
segment of the Iraqi diaspora, representative of each particular emigrant group. This is a 
technical problem I alleviated by contacting other Iraqi migrants of Sunni or Shi‘a background. 
Nevertheless, the life stories and information offered by interviewees complemented the 
qualitative research. Even more, they offer tangible examples of the motivations and 
expectations of certain Iraqis for return. The personal stories of Iraqis provided insight into this 
specific situation that secondary literature could not provide.  
Table 1 in the Annex outlines the basic characteristics of interviewees: date of 
emigration, ethnicity, education, religion, host countries and reason for return. Two interviews 
were with Kurdish Iraqis who had migrated to Austria, six were with Arab Iraqis who had moved 
to the U.S., and two were with Arab Iraqis living in Egypt. Four interviews were with Christians, 
two with Sunni Muslims, one with a Shi‘a Muslim and three stated that they were not religious 
(although one of these stated that she comes from a conservative and practicing Muslim family). 
Half of the interviewees left Iraq after 2003, and the others left while Saddam Hussein was still 
in power (but before 1995). Only one interviewee returned permanently, and all return trips 
occurred within the last two years. When face-to-face or telephone interviews were not feasible, 
detailed surveys targeted to the specific person‘s migration experience were used.4 I was able to 
tailor the interview or survey because I either knew the subject personally, or was introduced to 
them through a mutual contact who informed me of basic information (e.g. host country, 
temporary return migration experience). 
 Thirdly, I was able to correspond and meet with two scholars of Iraqi migration currently 
doing research in Iraq and/or Jordan, conducting two expert interviews. These connections 
proved invaluable as sources of information on the current situation, since there is a dearth of 
literature on Iraqi migration patterns and transnational connections, a lack of reliable statistics, 
and I was unable to do first-hand research in Iraq. 
                                                 
4
 See Annex for an example of a survey. 
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 For pragmatic reasons I was not able to do research in Iraq. However, this study is valid 
as it uses the research currently available. Furthermore, it integrates input from experts currently 
doing research in Iraq as well as Iraqis who have made return trips to Iraq recently. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Definitions 
2.1.1 Home country, host country, diaspora, expatriate, local, skilled migrant 
Each of these terms is used within this thesis in different ways. Home country and host country 
correspond to the country of birth and the country of citizenship or settlement, respectively. The 
term ―diaspora‖ will be used to describe the larger Iraqi community living abroad, including 
those of the second generation and those born in Iraq but raised abroad. According to Sheffer: 
―Modern diasporas are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host 
countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin—
their homelands.‘‖5 This term will also be used to include Iraqi Kurds, as their Kurdish homeland 
overlaps with the current borders of the Iraqi state. Expatriates form a subset within this group, 
referring to individual Iraqi-born persons residing abroad, who may or may not participate in a 
larger Iraqi community. This will be used to describe persons who permanently reside abroad, 
even if they make a short return trips to their home country, in contrast to the term ―local‖, which 
will be used to describe those within the home country who do not live abroad. A further subset 
is skilled migrants or professionals, whom Vertovec has defined as those with a tertiary-level 
education or ―extensive specialized work experience.‖6  
 
2.1.2 Development 
For the purpose of this thesis, I use the UNRISD draft definition of development in referring to 
development. Development:  
can be broadly understood as processes of change that lead to improvements in 
human well-being, social relations and social institutions, that are equitable, 
sustainable, and compatible with principles of democratic governance and social 
justice…[moving] away from a singular focus on economic growth and material 
                                                 
5
 Gabriel Sheffer (1986), ―A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics‖, In G. Sheffer (Ed.), 
Modern Diasporas in International Politics, London: Croom Helm, p.3. 
6
 Steven Vertovec (2002, February 14-15), ―Transnational Networks and Skilled Labour Migration‖, Paper presented 
at Ladenburger Diskurs Migration, Gottlieb Daimler- und Karl Benz-Stiftung, Ladenburg, p. 2. 
<http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/WPTC-02-02%20Vertovec.pdf> Last accessed 7 December 
2010.  
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well-being (measured in terms of income or GDP), or concern with the agency of 
the abstract individual, towards an approach which reintegrates social and 
collective dimensions into the fundamental conceptualization, measurement and 
practice of ‗development‘ and which rejects the widely accepted dualism of ‗the 
economic‘ and ‗the social‘.7 
This definition emphasizes the importance of economic growth alongside increased well-being. 
Development should not been seen in purely economic terms, as it encompasses economic, 
social and political dimensions. These other dimensions should be included and addressed, for 
they have important impacts on a person‘s quality of life and long-term goals. Therefore, when 
referring to ―development‖, this thesis refers to a wider concept that covers the economic, social 
and political aspects. 
 
2.2 Theory 
Existing migration theory tends to stress the push and pull factors of migration: certain reasons 
―push‖ a migrant out of his or her country, while other reasons ―pull‖ a migrant from his or her 
country, e.g. a migrant would be ―pushed‖ from his or her home country because there are no job 
opportunities there, and would be ―pulled‖ to a host country based on the opportunities offered 
there. These factors have often been framed as economic decisions, whether on the micro or 
macro level. However, as de Haas has highlighted, ―an improved theoretical perspective on 
migration and development has to be able to account for the role of structure—the constraining 
or enabling general political, institutional, economic, social and cultural context in which 
migration takes place—as well as agency—the limited but real capacity of individuals to 
overcome constraints and potentially reshape structure.‖8 Furthermore, the relationship between 
migration and development must also ―be scrutinized as a field of struggle where different actors 
are involved in trying to establish their visions of development and change.‖9 This perspective 
would account for both micro and macro level factors, both of which impact migration. 
 The New Economics of Migration theory is one such way to integrate both levels, as it 
places migrants in a larger societal context, taking into account family or community strategies 
                                                 
7
 UNRISD (2010), Unofficial draft. 
8
 Hein de Haas (2010), ―Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective‖, IMR 44(1), p. 241. 
9
 Petra Dannecker (2009), ―Migrant Visions of Development: A Gendered Approach‖, Population, Space and Place 
15, p. 122. 
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for risk sharing and a variety of markets. Stark and Bloom
10
 especially pioneered this theory, 
framing migration decisions as a way to diversify risk at the meso level: neither as an individual 
decision nor as a result of market trends, but at the community level, between the two.
11
 Network 
theory also brings together the micro and the macro levels. Tilly has defined networks as ―neither 
individuals nor households but sets of people linked by acquaintance, kinship and work 
experience.‖12 These networks link populations in home countries and host countries across time 
and space.
13
 This theory, extensively elaborated by Massey
14
, posits that networks increase the 
chance for migration. Migration costs and risks are reduced and benefits increase if potential 
migrants have a network abroad, as this network can serve as a support structure, establishing a 
migrant socially and economically in the new country. Migrant networks can make migration 
seem more appealing to those in the home country by easing the job search, establishment of 
connections to others and integration into the host country. Massey et al. have argued that at a 
certain point migration ―becomes self-perpetuating because each act of migration itself creates 
the social structure needed to sustain it.‖15 The first migrant establishes a network by connecting 
him or herself with persons in the home country, and thus improves the chances for others in the 
home country to migrate. Myrdal and Massey have called this process cumulative causation, as 
each individual migration makes it more likely for others in the home society to migrate.
16
 
Network theory has also called attention to the inequalities created within networks, based on 
social relations: ―social ties in pre-migration networks are related to factors affecting which 
people migrate, the means of migration, the destination (including locality, accommodation and 
                                                 
10
 Oded Stark and David E. Bloom (1985, May), ―New Economics of Labor Migration‖, The American Economic 
Review 75(2), pp. 173-178; Oded Stark (1978), Economic-Demographic Interactions in Agricultural Development: 
The Case of Rural-to-Urban Migration. Rome: FAO; Oded Stark (1991), The Migration of Labor. Cambridge and 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
11
 However, this theory has been criticized because power structures and inequalities between households and based 
on age, gender, etc. are not taken into account. Furthermore, it overlooks non-familial social bonds and individual 
agency of family members, who may migrate against family wishes. See de Haas, Migration, pp. 251-256. 
12
 Charles Tilly (1990), ―Transplanted networks‖ In V. Yans-MacLoughlin (Ed.), Immigration Reconsidered, New 
York: Oxford University Press, p. 84. 
13
 Monica Boyd (1989, Autumn), ―Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments 
and New Agendas‖ International Migration Review 23(3), p. 641. 
14
 Douglas S.Massey and Garcia Espana (1987), ―The social process of international migration‖ Science 237, pp. 
733-738; Douglas S. Massey (1990, July), ―The social and economic origins of immigration‖ Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 510, pp. 60-72;  Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme 
Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino and J. Edward Taylor (1993, September), ―Theories of International 
Migration: A review and Appraisal‖, Population and Development Review 19(3), pp. 431-465. 
15
 Massey et al., Theories, p. 449. 
16
 Gunnar Myral (1957), Rich Lands and Poor. New York: Harper and Row; Douglas S. Massey (1990), ―Social 
structure, household strategies, and the cumulative causation of migration‖, Population Index 56: pp. 3-26. 
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often specific job) and future prospects for physical and occupational mobility.‖17 If networks 
perpetuate migration, it stands to reason that migration would be encouraged primarily in 
specific sections of the home and host society, where the network operates. 
Recently, more attention has been focused on the engagement of diasporas, whose 
networks may encourage emigration from the home country, impacting the economic 
development of the home country. This has spurred a ―brain drain‖ versus ―brain gain‖ debate. 
The migration of the highly skilled from low-income countries to high-income countries, largely 
in North America and Europe, has been termed a ―brain drain‖ because of the loss of skills and 
capital this represents for poorer countries. The OECD has recently highlighted the negative role 
the ―brain drain‖ has on low-income countries:  
First, the loss of skilled and innovative people often means the loss of their ideas 
for productivity and governance and the benefits they would otherwise provide to 
their coworkers, students and fellow citizens. 
Second, in many countries a significant portion of the cost of education is paid for 
out of fiscal revenues. The departure of highly educated emigrants then represents 
an export of human capital in which the nation has invested. In addition, there is a 
loss of potential tax revenue that might have been raised from the income of the 
emigrant, though this needs to be balanced against diminished public spending on 
the emigrant and his or her family as well as transfers to the home economy via 
remittances… 
Third, the loss of key personnel makes the delivery of critical social services, such 
as health care and education, more difficult.
18
 
On the other hand, if these highly skilled individuals were to stay in their home countries or all 
return home, their skills may not be put to use, the result of which would be a ―brain waste‖. 
―Brain gain‖ or, more recently, ―brain circulation‖, has been argued by Stark, Bloom, Newland, 
Hugo and others
19
 as a way for development in the home country to be encouraged through the 
emigration of the highly skilled. In this case, migration provides an opportunity for the highly 
skilled to increase their economic, cultural and social capital, which can then be engaged in the 
home country: ―For many countries, Diaspora are a major source of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), market development (including outsourcing of production), technology transfer, 
                                                 
17
 Vertovec, Transnational, p. 3. 
18
 OECD (2007), Policy Coherence for Development: Migration and Developing Countries, Paris: OECD. 
19
 Stark and Bloom, New; Stark, Migration; Kathleen Newland (2009, October), ―Circular Migration and Human 
Development.‖ UNDP Research Paper 2009/42; Graeme Hugo (2003, June 1), ―Circular Development: Keeping 
Development Rolling?‖ University of Adelaide, Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute. 
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philanthropy, tourism, political contributions, and more tangible flows of knowledge, new 
attitudes, and cultural influence.‖20 In fact, the World Bank estimated the level of remittances to 
developing countries at US$325 billion in 2010.
21
 However, in 2008, remittances to Iraq were 
estimated at only US$3 million.
22
 Although remittances can have an important impact on the 
economic development of a country, this thesis will not concentrate on the abstract level of 
remittances and GDP, as the proportion of remittances to Iraq is relatively small, comparatively. 
Rather, attention will be focused on the return of human capital, especially that of skilled 
migrants. Newland and Hugo have described the attraction of circular migration for home 
country development, through the return of skills without forcing expatriates to permanently 
return.
23
 Many programs have been based on this concept: the International Organization for 
Migration‘s (IOM) repatriation efforts and the United Nations Development Program‘s (UNDP) 
Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) program have been lauded for 
their role in engaging expatriate professionals in developing countries (despite the low 
participation of expatriates and the high costs). The Iraqis Building Iraq (IRI) program, which 
will be discussed later, was in fact modeled after TOKTEN. Moreover, Meyer and Brown 
detected ―at least forty-one formal knowledge networks linking thirty countries to their skilled 
nationals abroad…categorize[d] …into five types: student/scholarly networks, local associations 
of skilled expatriates, expert pool assistance through TOKTEN, and intellectual/scientific 
diaspora networks.‖24 These networks specifically target skilled migrants for work in the home 
country, often in the context of development work. 
In fact, diasporas have a dual role. They can encourage ―brain drain‖ as well as ―brain 
gain‖. At the same time, diasporas can be peace-makers and peace-wreckers in their home 
society, especially when one examines post-conflict societies. Koser and Brinkerhoff have 
emphasized diasporas as partners in war-torn societies, linking internal and external actors in 
                                                 
20
 Kathleen Newland with Erin Patrick (2004, July), ―Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty 
Reduction in their Countries of Origin.‖ Scoping study by the Migration Policy Institute for the Department of 
International Development, p. 2 
21
 The World Bank, <www.Worldbank.org> Last accessed 7 December 2010. 
22
 IOM (2010), ―Iraq‖, <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/iraq> Last accessed 7 December 2010. 
23
 Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias and Kathleen Newland (2007, April), ―Circular Migration and Development: Trends, 
Policy Routes and Ways Forward.‖ MPI Policy Brief; Newland, Circular;  Newland with Patrick, Beyond; Hugo, 
Circular. 
24
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peace-making activities.
25
 On the other hand, Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear and Engberg-
Pedersen
26
 have shown that in some cases diaspora involvement may prolong conflicts. Smith‘s 
Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers provides ten case studies of diaspora 
engagement in home countries, demonstrating the spectrum of involvement. She finds that: 
―Diasporas can be both ‗peace-makers‘ and ‗peace-wreckers‘; they can be both at different 
periods and at the same time, and in order to assess their role it is necessary to understand the 
historical context, as well as their interests, aspirations, institutions and objectives.‖27 In fact, as 
Raghuram emphasizes, ―outcomes depend on what form diasporic interventions take.‖28 The 
multiple factors at play within the diaspora, as well as the varied actors with whom the diaspora 
interacts, guide diaspora actions. Therefore, diaspora engagement with the home country can 
have ambiguous, or even contradictory, results.  
A transnational perspective integrates these complexities, emphasizing the multiple 
connections migrants may have. It recognizes that migrants may engage simultaneously with two 
or more societies and that migration is often transitory and recurring. This concept evolved in 
contrast to the previous assumption that migration was unidirectional, direct and permanent. 
Transnational theories emerged in the early 1990s, and focus on the cross-border activities in 
which migrants engage, linking countries of origin, destination and transit through family, social, 
economic, political, organizational and religious connections.
29
 The ―transnational turn‖ has 
brought new insights to migration theory, drawing attention to that which has been previously 
overlooked, such as inequalities based on social differences, the new effects of globalization, and 
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the overlaps between political and economic migrants.
30
 Due to the boundary-crossing nature of 
these connections, Pries, Faist, Özveren and others have studied the non-national spaces within 
which migrants and their networks now operate.
31
 
In particular, the concept of transnationalism has recognized the inequalities at play 
among migrants. Transnational activity is characteristic of many Diasporas, who often 
participate simultaneously in their home and their host countries, as well as with their diasporic 
communities in other countries. Gender, age, class, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity, 
regional differences and even specific experiences of conflicts are all important factors at play 
within a diaspora. Davies, Al-Ali and Koser have highlighted the significance of various levels 
of power relations that change over time and space, especially as globalization has amplified 
these inequalities.
32
 Davies has outlined various forms of domination and subordination that 
affect power relations: 
 local, regional, national and global levels; 
 class; 
 non-reductionist and non-essentialist means of examining, negotiating and 
contextualizing properties of social identities; and 
 inclusion of political, ethnic, and ideological components within an autonomous 
political dynamic.
33
 
Inequalities are also especially noticeable in terms of gender across these levels, as elite males 
tend to lead the community, despite the increase in female-headed households in post-conflict 
societies,
34
 and as gender relations affect the networks available to migrants
35
. All of these 
different forms of power hierarchies not only interact within each level, but also among them, 
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creating complex arrangements of power that affects who migrates and to where, as well as who 
returns, with which means and to where. 
Al-Ali and Koser in particular have discussed the importance of motivation for diasporic 
engagement. There are differences between the motivations for migration, which are reflected in 
―push and pull‖ factors, and the motivations to be involved in transnational activities, which may 
reflect nationalist sentiments, political motivations, desires for an improved status, social 
pressure, and feelings of guilt, all of which interact with the manifold power structures at play. 
Furthermore, Levitt and Nyberg-Sorenson et al. add the important factor of the destination 
country, the latter noting that migration should be understood within a ―framework of interests 
and obligations that results from migrants‘ simultaneous engagement in countries of origin and 
destination.‖36 Therefore, diasporic engagement reflects motivations driven by various 
experiences in the home country, host country and/or within the diaspora. At the same time, 
these motivations are deeply rooted in the power relations at play in these spaces and at all 
levels. This means that while one refers to a ―diaspora‖ as the national community living outside 
the country, this community is not homogeneous. Rather, the different power structures impact 
an expatriate‘s goals, frame of mind and opportunities concerning the home country. 
These concepts have implications for the developmental role that transmigrants play; 
positions of power in the home and host countries favor some groups over others, and the 
reasons for transnational activity may not be conducive to sustainable development. Newland has 
highlighted this complex role: ―Such differences within and among Diaspora groups will 
influence the nature and scale of their capacity (and willingness) to act as agents of poverty 
reduction.‖37 So, when analyzing diaspora engagement, it is crucial to be mindful of the 
inequalities at play within a diaspora, as they can be reproduced within diaspora activities, which 
may not be conducive to certain development goals.  
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Case Study: Iraq 
 
Context 
Iraq is an oil-rich country in the Middle East, bordered by Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia. It has a population of 31.5 million
38
, with an Arab majority
39
, but a significant 
Kurdish minority
40
 and a small population of Turkmen, both based largely in the northern part of 
the country. Many within the Kurdish population do not identify as Iraqi but rather as Kurdish, 
and aspire to an independent Kurdistan. Iraq‘s population is 95% Muslim, of which the majority 
is Shi‘a, although Sunnis have traditionally held power.41 The remaining population is mostly 
Christian, of which there are various sects (Chaldeans, Assyrians, Roman Catholics), and a small 
number of Mandeans (who follow an ancient religion) and Yadizis (whose religion integrates 
elements of Islam and Christianity). Assyrians and Chaldeans come from the North, and tend to 
speak both Aramaic and Arabic, and Kurds speak Kurdish, although as part of the Arabization 
policy of the Ba'ath regime in the late 1980s most were forced to learn Arabic.  
Iraqi citizenship can currently be obtained through birth in Iraq or by having a father 
and/or mother who is an Iraqi citizen, and ―any Iraqi, who was denaturalized on political, 
religious, racist or sectarian grounds, shall have the right to restore his Iraqi nationality‖ except 
for Jews who lost their citizenship in 1950 and 1952.
42
 Furthermore, visas can be issued without 
reference to the ministry for: wives of Iraqis, foreigners of Iraqi origin and their families, foreign 
students, truck drivers, accredited diplomats and foreigners born in Iraq and their families.
43
 
Therefore, Iraqi citizenship or entry visas can be obtained easily by many of those who lost their 
citizenship during Saddam Hussein‘s regime, as well as their children, but this excludes Jewish 
Iraqis. 
Iraq‘s recent history has been dominated by the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, who 
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ruled the country from 1979 until 2003. He presented himself as the leader of the Ba‘th party, a 
pan-Arabism political party, and a Sunni Muslim. During his dictatorship, Iraq experienced two 
wars and severe sanctions: the Iran-Iraq War from September 1980 to August 1988, the Gulf War 
from August 1990 to February 1991, and economic sanctions from August 1990 until May 2003. 
While the wars destroyed Iraq economically and militarily, the sanctions led to a severe 
humanitarian crisis, characterized by a lack of medical supplies, food and clean water. Moreover, 
Saddam Hussein‘s Ba‘thist totalitarian regime suppressed all perceived opposition, through 
extensive surveillance systems, forced displacements, organized mass killings and torture. On 
May 22, 2003, Saddam Hussein‘s regime fell following a month-long U.S.-led military invasion 
of the country
44
 and a Provisional Government was set up. 
Post-invasion, unemployment soared, especially among Sunnis, due to the policy of de-
Ba‘thification, which dismissed around 30,000 Iraqis in middle-management jobs in ministries, 
schools and hospitals. In addition, there was nothing put into place to productively channel the 
large numbers of police or military members who were immediately dismissed from their jobs.
45
 
The high unemployment levels likely fed into the growing power of militias, who soon gained 
control of various parts of the country, inciting civil warfare. Militias forming along sectarian or 
tribal lines offered protection in return for service, for which every adult man had been trained 
due to their mandatory military service under Saddam Hussein. Violence escalated, and all 
international organizations withdrew from Iraq the 22 September 2003. Although elections were 
held and a new constitution written in 2005, the February 2006 bombing of the sacred Shi‘a 
mosque Askariya in Samarra, a city just north of Baghdad, provoked a resurgence in sectarian 
violence. Due to sectarian violence, counter attacks by the occupation forces, and corruption at 
all levels of government, among the many problems Iraq faces, its infrastructure is in tatters. 
Regardless of the current weakness of the Iraqi state, in September 2010, the U.S. ended its 
combat mission in Iraq, withdrawing the last combat brigade on the 20 August 2010. This 
withdrawal occurred despite the lack of a coalition government nearly six months after the 
March 7
th
 election, in which Ayad Allawi of the al-Iraqiyya coalition won by a mere 0.5% over 
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outgoing president Nouri al-Maliki of the State of Law Coalition. A tentative coalition was 
finally formed in November 2010, a full eight months after the elections. 
Iraq continues to be overwhelmed by corruption, lack of services and violence, among the 
many issues the country faces. Since 2003, the controversial Iraq Body Count has estimated over 
100,000
46
 Iraqi civilian deaths and UNHCR has estimated five million
47
 displaced to neighboring 
countries or regions, and there is currently a critical situation for Iraqi refugees and internally 
displaced persons. Nevertheless, there has in fact been a limited amount of return of expatriate 
Iraqi professionals. This group tends to have left Iraq prior to 2003 and to return for short-term 
consultancies on reconstruction efforts at higher levels of society.  
Because these expatriates tend to have left Iraq before 2003, and are considered members 
of a larger Iraqi diaspora, I first must outline the Iraqi population living outside the country and 
the circumstances under which they left the country. I will refer to them collectively as the Iraqi 
diaspora, although all members of the population do not necessarily identify themselves as part 
of this larger community. The reasons for emigration and the place of settlement affect 
motivations for return and their view of the home country. Shi‘a Muslims, Ba‘thists fleeing after 
2003, Kurds, Christians and Jews all think differently about Iraq because they tended to leave 
under different circumstances and used different networks to immigrate to different host 
countries. As Chatelard, a prominent Iraqi scholar, notes, Iraqis ―were themselves fragmented 
along strong class lines, various experiences that had prompted the migratory decision, political 
outlook, and, at times, religious or ethnic affiliations. Under these conditions...there existed no 
unified Iraqi exile community in any given reception country to speak in the name of an Iraqi 
migrant constituency.‖48 Thus the characteristics of Iraqi emigration are key to how various 
communities feel towards Iraq, and especially their desire to return. Each community‘s memories 
of Iraq vary, as do their views of the future, so the recruitment and return of any of these groups 
would affect development projects in Iraq. Therefore, in order to understand the role of Iraqi 
expatriates in development planning, it is important to first understand that their motivations, 
desires and expectations differ based on specific historical, cultural, religious, social, gendered 
and/or ethnic characteristics.  
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Because of Iraq's tumultuous history, Iraqis have migrated in significant numbers since 
the late 1950s, for political and/or economic reasons. In 2003, one out of every six Iraqis was 
abroad, and in 2004 this population was estimated at four million persons.
49
 To demonstrate the 
diversity of the Iraqi diaspora, I will first outline the history of Iraqi international migration, 
which began in the 1940s and 1950s, and over time affected particular groups during certain 
periods. It can be broken up into two periods: from the 1950s until 1990, and from 1990 to today. 
The first period is primarily migration for political reasons, while in the latter period, economic 
reasons become increasingly important. Then, in Chapter 4, I will discuss the most significant 
host countries for Iraqi migrants: the United States, the United Kingdom, Iran, Syria and Jordan. 
The Iraqi communities in each country vary due to the specific networks based on social, ethnic 
or religious ties that brought them there and their legal, social and economic situation in the host 
country, which affects the forms of engagement the communities have with Iraq. Finally, in 
Chapter 5, I will turn to the temporary return migration of skilled Iraqis, occurring through 
international programs and individual endeavors. In this last section I will use findings from my 
interviews evoking the various motivations for and experiences of return to complement the 
analysis of programs that recruited members of the Iraqi Diaspora (in particular Iraqis 
Rebuilding Iraq and the Local Governance Program) and the concept of ―re-engagement‖, or 
transnational activities of Iraqis in neighboring countries. 
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Chapter 3: A Short History of Iraqi Emigration 
 
3.1 1950s to the 1990s 
Beginning in the 1940s, Iraq experienced classical chain migration on a small scale: primarily 
men went abroad to pursue higher education and greater economic opportunities, and when some 
decided to stay abroad, they brought over their families. Soon, others were encouraged by the 
first generation's success and joined them abroad, but in the 1950s this group was supplanted by 
political migrants, who characterize the first wave of Iraqi emigration.  
The first large-scale forced migration from Iraq was the expulsion of the Jewish Iraqis 
following the establishment of Israel. The community of 130,000 Jewish Iraqis was well-
integrated within the Iraqi population and, although there were rare tensions, it was not until the 
establishment of Israel in 1948 that there was systematic harassment of Jews.
50
 Over the next few 
years, Jewish Iraqis were forcibly moved to Israel, and by 1952 only a few thousand remained.
51
 
Then, in 1958, a coup d'etat of the Iraqi Army overthrew the monarchy, establishing a 
government friendly to the Soviet Union. With the fall of the monarchy, the Sunni upper-classes, 
politicians and landowners, those who made up the monarchy bureaucracy, fled the country, 
mostly towards Jordan and the United Kingdom.
52
  
But this government lasted only to 1963, when it was overthrown by a coup of the Ba‘th 
Party, led by Colonel Abdul Salam Arif and General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakir. This coup pushed 
most of the communist sympathizers out of the country through door-to-door assassinations of 
supposed communists. For those in the exiled communist party, Paris and various Italian cities 
served as important poles, due to the historical significance of communist parties in France and 
Italy.
53
 However, Salam Arif died in 1966 and his brother took over, who was then overturned by 
a coup in 1968 that successfully established the Ba‘th Party, with the aging al-Bakir as president 
and Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti as his vice president. Members of opposition groups, especially 
the few remaining communists, left soon after, but the increasing instability signaled by the 
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numerous coups caused many others to leave as well. Sassoon notes that ―some of the best 
physicians left in 1969 and many of the teaching faculty of the Baghdad Medical School 
emigrated to the West.‖54 The exodus of the highly educated and skilled was soon recognized by 
the government, which tried to discourage further emigration. In the 1980s, Dowty analyzed 
emigration policies worldwide, placing Iraq among 21 states that impose the most stringent 
limits on emigration: ―Although large numbers [of people] may occasionally leave such states, 
legal exit is basically viewed as a privilege to be granted by the government rather than a right to 
be exercised.‖55 Passports were obtained based on individual or family loyalty to, or at the very 
least compliance with the regime.
56
 Once a passport was obtained, there were still multiple 
requirements in order to leave. Among the measures taken if one was leaving the country, the 
government required a guarantor who would be held responsible if the migrant did not return. 
Moreover, there were surveillance systems in place to ensure that people were not planning to 
leave, and if the hopeful migrants were discovered, they would be imprisoned and likely 
tortured. 
The government also tried to win back those who had left during the 1970s and 1980s by 
developing the education sector and emphasizing secularism and women‘s participation in 
society.
 57
 The Iraqi Provisional Constitution of 1970 granted women equal rights. Women 
attended universities, in the same courses as men, had the right to a year‘s maternity leave, 
integrated into the workforce, owned property, voted and ran for office. In addition, the Personal 
Status Code,
58
 which was updated in 1978, restricted men‘s ability to divorce their wives and 
increased women‘s rights to divorce, extended women‘s child custody, regulated inheritance 
requirements and placed limitations on polygamous, child and forced marriages. The General 
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Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) was set up to replace women‘s organizations, as the coup 
disbanded civil society groups. The GFIW had a contentious role, as it: 
grew to play a significant role in implementing state policy, primarily through its 
role in running more than 250 rural and urban community centers offering job-
training, educational, and other social programs for women and acting as a 
channel for communication of state propaganda. Female officers within the GFIW 
also played a role in the implementation of legal reforms advancing women‘s 
status under the law and in lobbying for changes to the personal status code. On 
the other hand, some Iraqi women have argued that as a political arm of the Ba‘ath 
party, the GFIW was destructive to women‘s issues in Iraq and ‗did not reflect or 
represent the struggle of millions of oppressed Iraqi women.‘59 
So, although women‘s rights and participation in society were encouraged, this was at times at 
the expense of others. The government co-opted women‘s issues for its own agenda, and while it 
tackled concerns related to illiteracy, access to education and women‘s rights, its disbanding of 
the entire independent civil society sector ensured that there was no independent voice was 
heard. This was obvious to many intellectuals at the time, many of whom chose to immigrate to 
Western countries where freedom of speech was protected. 
At the same time as it was trying to win back the highly skilled, the government was 
deporting those it considered undesirable. From 1969 onwards, the Fayli Kurds, a Shi'a minority 
within the Sunni Kurdish population, were forcefully deported to Iran along with any others 
considered of Iranian origin as part of the policy of Arabization.
60
 This grew to later include 
―mass deportation of Kurds (and later Turkmen), confiscation of their properties, and the 
implantation of Arabs in their houses. This well-calculated ethnic cleansing, which remained in 
force for more than three decades, not only produced tens of thousands of refugees and IDPs, it 
also created ethnic tensions in an area that previously had been spared similar manifestations.‖61 
The open war of the Kurds against the Iraqi regime led to a large-scale Kurdish emigration, and 
their early establishment of migratory networks served to facilitate further Kurdish migration 
through communal and familial connections. But it was not the violence against the Kurds, 
which would only increase in the 1980s, that would serve as the real wake-up call for most 
Iraqis. Rather, it was July 1979, when Saddam Hussein consolidated his power, forcing al-Bakir 
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to resign and executing several top members of the Ba'th Party.
62
 From this moment until the 
American invasion in 2003, Saddam Hussein remained in power and migration steadily 
increased. 
 The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 meant the amplification of violence, especially 
against Kurds and those considered of Iranian origin, as Hussein's policy of Arabization targeted 
all those considered insurgents. The genocidal al-Anfal campaign between 1986 and 1989, which 
caused the destruction of villages and the gassing of thousands of Kurds, caused mass panic in 
northern Iraq and the migration of thousands to neighboring countries. The majority of migration 
during the 1980s was to Iran, through either expulsion or migration caused under extreme duress. 
The regime expelled thousands of ―urban Shi'ite religious and economic elites and members of 
the middle-class whom the regime considered a threat to the consolidation of its power and who, 
in many cases, had no family links to Iran...‖63 Among these were supporters of the Iranian 
revolution, deserters from the army, refugees and Kurds, who used the established cross-border 
networks based on commercial, religious, political and family ties.
64
  
Up until 1990, migration was dominated by people leaving for political reasons. It was 
rarely solely for employment, as Iraq was an importer of labor for its oil industry. In fact, an 
estimated one million unskilled migrant workers lived in Iraq in the 1980s.
65
 Chatelard highlights 
the political and economic factors at work in Iraqi migration before 1990: 
The characteristics of Iraqi migration reflected the political and economic 
circumstances of the country that was producing it: its economic prosperity based 
on oil-extraction and trade; the developmental choices made by the regime that 
had allowed the emergence of a class of cadres and professionals who were 
granted employment; an unstable and contested state challenged by a variety of 
political movements; a problematic national construction in which some ethnic 
and confessional groups were targeted collectively by the regime; and a territorial 
sovereignty which was disputed internally and externally.
66
 
Between 1948 and 1990, Iraqi migration consisted largely of migrants along the spectrum of 
forced migration: from being physically moved out of the country to political persecution—
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represented by censorship and surveillance—pressuring a person to leave. During this time, 
Iraqis left largely for political reasons rather than economic, as Iraq‘s oil industry made the 
country wealthier than its neighbors and actually contributed to a growing middle class. But the 
increased violence under Saddam Hussein's regime, despite its rich resources, was a crucial 
factor in the emigration of a large part of the Iraqi population, especially the skilled and 
educated. Jews, monarchists, communists, Kurds, in fact anyone viewed as opposition to the 
ruling party, were targeted during this time and chose to migrate due to the unfriendly political 
situation. Because of the ethnic background and specific circumstances for leaving, many of 
these minorities remained in their distinct groups while abroad, especially as some groups had 
targeted others while in power, but this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 
3.2 1990s until today 
As Nyberg Sørenson, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen have highlighted, poverty often becomes 
the final ―push‖ for people to leave a politically harsh environment.67 For Iraqis this proved 
especially true: the majority of emigration happened during or after the Gulf War, as Iraqis, 
primarily of the upper- to middle-classes, realized that their chances were severely diminished by 
two consecutive wars and the subsequent economic sanctions. The exile community before the 
Gulf War has been estimated between one and one and a half million, but between 1990 and 
2002 another one and a half million Iraqis left for long-term settlement elsewhere.
68
 The eight-
year Iran-Iraq war constituted a major drain on the economy, but the Gulf War and the sanctions 
completely isolated Iraq from the rest of the world, disconnecting its income and effectively 
destroying its economy, which was based on oil revenue. Iraqis increasingly migrated for a 
mixture of reasons; political reasons still featured prominently, but the destruction of the Iraqi 
economy by wars and sanctions caused thousands more to emigrate for economic reasons. Iraqis 
left en masse as a result of the American-encouraged uprisings of the Iraqi Kurds and Shi'as (the 
intifada) in 1991 and their subsequent bloody repression, the drainage of the marshlands and 
dispossession of the Marsh Arabs from 1991-1995, and especially the imposition of economic 
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sanctions from 1990 to 2003, during which food and clean water were at times scarce.  
The economic sanctions had a disproportionate effect on women, whose advancements 
were reversed as women were pushed out of the workforce to make way for men, the financial 
ability to send children to school was severely reduced and tribal and conservative religious 
groups gained power. It is important to note the high amount of female-led households in Iraq in 
the 1990s. The Gulf War, Saddam Hussein‘s repression of opposition groups (especially targeting 
adult men, as was the case with the Marsh Arabs, for example) and especially the Iran-Iraq war 
stripped Iraq of a large amount of adult men: the Iran-Iraq War was devastating to both sides, but 
Iraqi casualties estimated at between 200,000-500,000 killed or wounded, in addition to 
thousands of civilians who died from air attacks. While there was a welfare and childcare system 
for women, they were increasingly excluded from the labor market and especially hard-hit by 
poverty, inadequate health care, no electricity or clean water, violence and lack of security.  
The sanctions not only weakened women‘s status and effectively destroyed the Iraqi 
economy, but it also had a devastating effect on education, causing a huge wave of brain drain: 
―No research journals were allowed to arrive in Iraq once the sanctions took effect. Also, there 
was a total embargo on Iraqis participating in international conferences. At that time, the internet 
was not prevalent and so research journals and conferences were the main channels for learning 
and development, particularly with regard to scientific research.‖69 Iraqi education was hit hard, 
and migration snowballed; the higher classes, those with connections to obtain money for exit or 
skills desired for labor contracts in other countries (especially Jordan, Yemen and Libya), left the 
country. In response to the exodus of the Iraqi upper- to middle-class, educated, urban 
community, the regime implemented an exit tax in 1993 and then in 1994 a deposit of one 
million Iraqi dinars (US$665) as a guarantee of return for all those with university degrees, in 
addition to various other requirements.
70
 Migrants also had to pay large sums to obtain travel 
documents. There was also the social pressure that punished the families of those who left 
illegally, putting them under surveillance by the secret police and in potential danger. On the 
other hand, amnesties were also granted for some who had sought asylum (who, under the law, 
could be sentenced to death) in the 1990s and 2000s in an attempt to bring Iraqi professionals 
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back.
71
 These measures did discourage two groups of the middle-class from leaving: ―First, those 
who were under no direct physical threat but were affected by the deterioration in living 
standards resulting from the economic blockade. Second those whose access to financial means 
was limited or who, having insufficient capital, were unable to mobilise such capital within their 
own social groups.‖72 Therefore, those that left were either under direct pressure or had sufficient 
funds (on their own or with help from networks) to leave and establish themselves in a new 
country. Nonetheless, migrants used their class and professional assets, as well as communal 
networks (especially in the case of Assyrians and Chaldeans) to emigrate, and by the time of the 
American invasion in 2003, the Iraqi diaspora had doubled in a little over ten years, with 
estimates ranging from two to four million Iraqi exiles. 
The American-led invasion of Iraqi in March 2003 and the defeat of Saddam's regime, 
rather than reversing the Iraqi brain drain, accelerated it by worsening the humanitarian crisis 
and destroying infrastructure. Although there was originally no large refugee or emigration 
movement post-invasion (save for high-level Ba‘thists fleeing the country), and in fact some 
Iraqis returned, hoping to play a role in post-Saddam Iraq, the poor handling of the country post-
invasion plunged the country into violence and contributed to higher levels of emigration:  
The state under the Ba‘th regime functioned despite being constrained by severe 
and inhumane sanctions. The occupation authorities, on the other hand, 
dismantled the key pillars of the state before setting up new ones. As a result, 
many parts of the functioning machine imploded, leading a dramatic degradation 
in the provision of essential services, health care, education and the civil service. 
Corruption...spread and permeated all levels of government. There is no doubt 
that the decline in all vital sectors began in the 1990s, but after the invasion the 
state could barely function.
73
 
Although the networks facilitating migration were much the same, Sassoon sees a crucial 
difference between the decision-making process for migration during the Ba'th regime and 
migration after 2003. During the Ba'th regime, Iraqis were forced between the decision of either 
submission or flight, while now they are faced with an impossible situation plagued by violence, 
low public services, high unemployment, growing poverty, corruption, and smuggling.
74
 
Nonetheless, from 1990 until today, economic reasons became deeply intertwined with political 
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reasons for leaving, as the Iraqi economy went from bad to worse under economic sanctions and 
then post-2003 mismanagement.  
Part of the reason for the disintegration of the state was the policy of blanket de-
Ba'thification: ―Overnight almost 30,000 Iraqis…were dismissed from their jobs. The senior 
management of the country had already fled or been arrested and now middle management were 
kicked out. The result was a huge vacuum the Americans could not fill.‖75 That, in addition to the 
disbanding of the 500,000 member Iraqi Army, created hundreds of thousands of unemployed, 
which may have fed into the growing sectarian violence. The unemployment rate for Iraqi 
professionals soared: a UNDP and Iraqi Ministry of Planning survey estimated unemployment 
for men with secondary or tertiary education at 37.2 percent.
76
 Many of those of the middle class 
that had not left before now fled, taking much-needed capital away from the country.  
As Iraq descended into civil war, women, minorities and returned exiles became the most 
vulnerable for attack in Iraq, as they lacked the connections needed for protection. One Christian 
interviewed for this study highlighted the change within her neighborhood, ―Under Saddam, we 
had no problems, and lived in a mixed neighborhood. But the feeling changed after, and we had 
more worries. For forty years we lived there and knew the families, and then we started getting 
threats, threatening snipers and bribes to leave.‖77 The increasing sectarian violence has 
especially had disastrous effects on women‘s rights: women are now prevented from attending 
classes with their male colleagues and are vulnerable to attack if they are unaccompanied or 
deemed to be inappropriately dressed. Due primarily to the lack of progress in women‘s issues, 
in February 2009 the Minister of Women‘s Affairs Nawal al-Samaraie resigned, accusing the 
government of ―ignoring what she called an ‗army‘ of uneducated women, widows, victims of 
domestic violence and female internally displaced persons who were in dire need of 
assistance.‖78 Moreover, unemployment is high for women, and many have turned to domestic 
work despite their college credentials.
79
  
At the same time, women have also been at the forefront of improving conditions. Al-
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Ali‘s work with Iraqi women has highlighted the main issues mobilizing women in Iraq today80:  
(1) the attempt to replace the relatively progressive personal status law governing 
marriage, divorce and child custody with a more conservative law (Article 137 in 
2003, and Article 41 of the new constitution 2005/06); (2) the issue of a women‘s 
quota for political representation …; (3) the struggle against sectarianism and for 
national unity; (4) struggle against Islamist encroachment both from political 
parties and from militias and terrorist organizations; (5) the debate over the Iraqi 
constitution, mainly with respect to the role of Islam, the personal status laws and 
the demand to include an article covering international conventions… and  (6) the 
targeted murders of professional women and women‘s rights activists.81 
To work on these issues, women have organized themselves, and have emerged as particularly 
strong civil society actors. Although civil society organizations were disbanded under Saddam 
Hussein, they reemerged after 2003 and women‘s groups especially have flourished. Many of 
these groups are founded by diaspora returnees (who left before 2003), members of appointed 
interim governments or prominent professional women with ties to political parties. Although the 
groups are founded and represented by elite women, some have broad membership with branches 
throughout the country and varying views of the occupation.
82
 Especially of note are the National 
Council of Women (NWC), Iraqi Women‘s Higher Council (IWHC), Iraqi Independent Women‘s 
Group, Society for Iraqi Women for the Future, and the Iraqi Women‘s Network (Al-Shabaka), 
the latter of which brings together ―thirty-seven women‘s grassroots organizations across the 
country. Their activities revolve around humanitarian and practical projects, such as income 
generation, legal advice, free health care and counseling, as well as political advocacy and 
lobbying.‖83 These organizations have been especially active in the debate over the Iraqi 
constitution, and many were founded by or involved diaspora women (especially from the U.S. 
and the U.K.). Their activities have been hindered by the violent conditions in Iraq: foreign 
passport holders, middle class professionals, emergency service providers and teachers have been 
targeted, putting Iraqi women, especially returnees, in grave danger. Furthermore, Iraqi 
minorities are under increasing pressure, as they are also targets of violence. Although minorities 
make up only ten percent of the Iraqi population, in 2007 the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees determined that they make up about 30 percent of Iraqi refugees around the 
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world.
84
 Christians in particular are targeted,
85
 especially following Pope Benedict XVI‘s critical 
remarks of Islam in September 2006.
86
 The Christian population has drastically shrunk: the last 
Iraqi census in 1987 counted 1.4 million Christians; in 2006 the population was estimated at less 
than one million; in 2008 they were estimated at between 550,000-800,000, and there are thought 
to be even fewer now.
87
 
Additionally, Iraqi professionals, doctors and academics began to be targeted, either for 
being associated with the Ba'th regime, for speaking freely or for their assumed ability to pay 
ransom if kidnapped. As of September 2010, the Brussels Tribunal website listed 448 Iraqi 
academics killed, 79 threatened or kidnapped, and 120 student and teacher casualties.
88
 The Iraqi 
Lawyers Association estimated in 2007 that since the 2003 invasion, at least 210 lawyers and 
judges had been killed and legal services had decreased by at least 40 percent.
89
 Physicians were 
also especially targeted, as the Department of Health was corrupted by gangs and militias, and by 
2006 the global health charity Medact estimated that 25 percent of Iraq's physicians had 
emigrated.
90
 Emergency medical staff have admitted that ―more than half of those killed could 
have been saved if trained and experienced staff were available. Our experience has taught us 
that poor emergency medical services are more disastrous than the disaster itself.‖91 This brain 
drain has severely impacted Iraqi development, as the best minds of Iraq and much of the 
necessary capital to rebuild it have left. Moreover, unlike other countries, Iraq is not repaid for 
this loss through remittances. In 2008, remittances were estimated at only US$3 million,
92
 an 
                                                 
84
 Preti Taneja (2007), ―Assimilation, Exodus, Eradication: Iraq's minority communities since 2003‖, Minority 
Rights Group International Report, p. 3. 
85
 IRIN, ―Iraq: Christians live in fear of death squads‖, < http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=61897> Last 
accessed 7 December 2010. 
86
 BBC (2006, September 16), ―In quotes: Muslim reaction to Pope‖, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5348436.stm> Last accessed 7 December 2010; and BBC (2006, September 17), 
―Pope sorry for offending Muslims‖, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5353208.stm> Last accessed 7 December 
2010. 
87
 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2009, January 15), ―Iraq: Overview of the situation of Christians; 
violence against Christians in Baghdad and the North; displacement; government protection; situation of the 
Christian minority in the Kurdistan region (2003-2008)‖, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49913b5e17.html> 
Last accessed 7 December 2010. 
88
 BRussels Tribunal, ―List of killed, threatened or kidnapped Iraqi Academics‖ 
<http://www.brusselstribunal.org/academicsList.htm> Last accessed 7 December 2010. 
89
 IRIN (2007, April 30), ―Iraq: Justice delayed as lawyers live under threat‖, 
<http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=71864> Last accessed 7 December 2010. 
90
Sassoon, Iraqi, p. 142. 
91
 Bassim Irheim Mohammed Al-Sheibani, Najah R. Hadi and Tariq Hasson (2006, October 21), ―Iraq lacks facilities 
and expertise in emergency medicine‖ In: British Medical Journal 333: p. 847. 
92
 IOM, ―Iraq: Facts and Figures‖, <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/iraq> Last accessed 7 December 2010. 
Hendow, Maegan Page 29 
 
extremely small number to sustain an estimated population of 31.5 million. Moreover, Iraq 
experiences ―reverse remittances‖, whereby refugees use their savings or pensions in Iraq to 
support themselves and their families abroad.
93
 The exodus of Iraqis from 1990 to today has been 
even more damaging to Iraq, as Iraqis have left at a higher frequency than during the first wave, 
taking away economic capital and skills from an already seriously deteriorated country. 
The Iraqi diaspora has been formed by migrations along the forced migration spectrum, 
the majority leaving to escape from persecution or due to the degraded and volatile conditions in 
Iraq. Chatelard illuminates the primary characteristic of Iraqi migrants:   
Although the volume of the various displacement episodes…has been variable, 
one constant has been their collective nature: the displaced have been members of 
social groups identified by various political regimes as sharing an identity both 
cohesive and primordialized (ethnic, confessional, ethno-confessional or ethno-
national, but also based on kinship ties within a patriarchal system) deemed 
incompatible with and/or a threat to some notion of an Iraqi national order.‖94  
Since the creation of the Iraqi state until today, certain groups of Iraqis are targeted based on the 
potential threat they pose to those in power. Kurds, Shi‘as, Marsh Arabs, Christians, women: 
these groups have been threatened or attacked at one time or another for the singular reason that 
they belong to one of these (or multiple) groups. This has only added to the divisions within the 
Iraqi diaspora, as each group has a particular history of persecution that it tends to emphasize 
over those of others. Moreover, these ethnic, religious or other forms of ties are strengthened 
because it has been these networks that have influenced the direction of Iraqi migration. Iraqis 
have spread across the globe through class, professional and communal networking, and 
although they have left, they continue to have the potential to affect Iraq based on the particular 
political opportunity structures available to Iraqis in host countries.
95
 The next section will 
address the various Iraqi communities in the U.S., the U.K., Iran, Syria and Jordan, which have 
developed in specific ways due to the make-up of the Iraqi community in the host country in 
conjunction with the respective host country‘s policies towards the Iraqi community. 
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Chapter 4: Where they went: Iraqi trajectories 
 
Besides the different circumstances surrounding departure, which affect an emigrant‘s perception 
of Iraq, the chosen host country affects the development of each emigrant group. Each host 
country offers different opportunities based on structures at work within both the host country 
and the Iraqi community. Class, religion, gender, regional and ethnic differences all play a very 
important role in each country and Iraqi community. Some minority groups are overrepresented 
in certain host countries because family, religious and social connections encouraged migration 
to already established communities, which were created within specific historical moments 
outlined in Chapter 4. This means not only that the hierarchies at play within an ethnic or 
religious group are reinforced, but also that those who do not fit within this specific Iraqi 
community may be excluded from Iraqi diasporic activities in the host country. Furthermore, the 
status of Iraqis in the host country accords different freedoms: Iraqis in the U.S. without 
citizenship have had to be careful about their activities and in some cases reduce their return 
trips, but have been included and active in U.S. government projects concerning Iraq. In contrast, 
Iraqis in neighboring countries have had more regular contact with Iraq, and social interactions 
are well established with the homeland, but they have had little interaction with their host 
societies and tend to be excluded from government plans.  
Due to these differences, it is necessary to outline the communities in a selection of 
prominent host countries because the development of each Iraqi community affects their views 
of development, the opportunities and motivations for return, and the role an individual might 
play if they return to Iraq. Denise Natali has used the framework of ―political opportunity 
structures‖ to explain the different opportunities at home and abroad that influenced Kurdish 
involvement in the Iraq War.
96
 This approach can be widened and applied when examining Iraqi 
involvement in development programs in their home country. If an Iraqi expatriate is consulted 
on development planning in Iraq, his or her time of emigration, as well as participation in a 
particular Iraqi community in a host country would have an important effect on his or her 
opinion of and participation in said development programs.  
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The majority of Iraqi emigration has been to neighboring Arab countries: Iran, Jordan, 
Turkey,
97
 and Syria, but there are also large populations in Yemen, Egypt, Lebanon, and the Gulf 
states. For the Western world, it has been primarily to the UK, the US, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Sweden, but there has also been notable migration to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Indonesia and Malaysia.
98
 However, it should be noted that, while five nation-states (six, 
including Iraq) have been chosen as examples, Iraqis have circulated within and across various 
social, religious, political and economic spaces. This is due in a large part to its history as part of 
the Ottoman Empire, which established trade, pilgrimage routes and other networks across the 
empire and whose dissolution in 1918 led to the creation of arbitrary territories by European 
victors and not those in the region. People in modern day Iraq have been connected within and 
beyond the region for centuries, and this project looks at only a snippet of this time. Despite this, 
this chapter will look into five specific host countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Iran, Syria and Jordan) because at the moment immigration and citizenship policies are 
developed at the nation-state level. These five countries have been chosen because each has a 
strong and unique Iraqi community that has evolved based on the migrants‘ experiences in Iraq 
and reasons for leaving, in conjunction with the specific opportunity structures available in the 
host country. The following section will outline the specific characteristics of the Iraqi 
communities in these five countries. 
 
4.1 The United States: Detroit, Michigan and San Diego, California 
In 2009, the number of persons born in Iraq and living in the U.S. was estimated at 102,393, less 
than 0.5 percent of all foreign-born in the country.
99
 However, the majority of this migration has 
not happened post-2003.
100
 Rather, the majority of Iraqi immigration to the U.S. occurred in the 
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1990s, and after 1991 around 3,000 Iraqis arrived in Detroit each year.
101
 Most of these 
immigrants in the 1990s were Shi‘a Muslims from the south who were targeted after the intifada 
uprisings, when the U.S. encouraged them to revolt against Saddam Hussein. These migrants had 
little education and low-income jobs, were largely rural and poor, and struggled with English.
102
 
There were also many more Christians arriving—around 18,000 Chaldeans after 1991—as they 
were even more systematically discriminated against and openly persecuted in Iraq in the 1990s, 
because Christianity was associated with US imperialism.
103
 However, the Iraqi community in 
the U.S. has a much longer history, and it has had an important impact on the subsequent waves 
of Iraqi immigrants—not only on who has come to the U.S., but also often on where they settle. 
The Iraqi community has strong bases in Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; and San 
Diego, California. In 2007, Michigan had the largest population of Iraqi immigrants, at 36,172, 
or 35.3 percent of the community—of which 35,010 were in the Detroit metropolitan area—and 
California had the second largest community at 16,715, or 16.3 percent.
104
 Sally Howell and 
Andrew Shryock outline the Arab community in Detroit
105
: Dearborn, the suburban area of 
metropolitan Detroit where most Arabs live, is made up of Lebanese, Yemenis, Iraqis, and 
Palestinians. The ―Seven Mile Road‖ in Detroit is mostly made up of Chaldean Catholics, and at 
times it is more common to hear Aramaic in the streets than English. However, when these 
immigrants are able to save enough money, they move out of the area to the suburbs, ―where 
Chaldeans and other Arabic-speaking immigrants are widely recognized as an influential 
business and professional community. Detroit's grocery and liquor store trade is dominated by 
Iraqis…[and] there are over 5,000 Arab and Chaldean-owned businesses in greater Detroit.‖106 
As can be noticed in this description, the community is largely segregated along class, religious 
and ethnic lines: Chaldean Christians live within their own communities, where they are able to 
speak to each other in Aramaic rather than any other language; wealthier Iraqis move to 
suburban areas. Detroit‘s community is predominantly Chaldean Catholic (a community of 
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between 70 and 80,000)
107
 and in fact, Christians make up half of the Arab community in 
Detroit, even though they constitute only five percent of the Arab world.
108
 This characteristic, as 
well as the geographic displacement of the two largest communities, is due primarily to the first 
Iraqi migrants to arrive in the US.  
In the early 20
th
 century, Assyrians and Chaldeans were the first group of Iraqis to arrive, 
choosing Michigan (due particularly to the burgeoning auto industry in Detroit) and California to 
work or study, and to escape religious persecution. Most Chaldeans came from the Tal Kayf 
village near Mosul in the north.
109
 Some of these migrants decided to settle, and brought their 
families over through chain family migration. The reason why this has been particularly decisive 
for the development of the Iraqi-American community is because of the change in the 
immigration system in the US in 1965. The new immigration law of 1965 dismantled the old 
quota system and instead placed greater emphasis on family ties and highly skilled 
immigrants.
110
 This meant that the vast majority of those who immigrated after 1965 were highly 
educated and upper- to middle-class, and that they were encouraged to use their already strong 
family and social networks to immigrate to the country, and to encourage immigration from 
Iraqis with similar profiles. The first Iraqi migrants were already fairly wealthy and educated, 
and so when U.S. immigration law changed, their social and religious communities directly 
benefitted.  
The same rule holds true for the Muslim migrants who arrived in the U.S., especially 
Shi‘a Muslims and Kurds. From the 1950s to the 1970s, upper middle-class Shi‘a Muslims 
arrived in the U.S. They were highly skilled, professional, and educated in Iraqi Shi‘a history and 
tradition and the American way of life.
111
 In the 1960s especially, while Iraq was going through 
multiple coups, Iraqis chose the U.S. because it was more liberal and stable than Iraq, where the 
upper classes, landowners, communists, Muslim elite, monarchists, and any opposition group 
were potentially in danger. Moreover, around 1976, when Kurds began fighting the regime, 
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many came to the San Diego area, followed by refugees or others arriving through family 
reunification and even more after the 1990s post-Gulf War uprisings.
112
 
Therefore, the first communities to arrive played an important role for those coming after, 
encouraging skilled migration and folding the new immigrants into an already established 
communal structure. This system favored the groups that had already arrived, while 
simultaneously encouraging only highly educated (and thus usually higher class) immigrants. 
They ―managed through mechanisms of family and communal solidarity and reproduced in the 
diaspora the socioeconomic, confessional and kinship patterns which had existed in Iraq within 
these…communities.113 The same structures and relations based on social, class, religious or 
ethnic ties that were in place in Iraq were transplanted to the U.S. and, as a result, within these 
Iraqi-American communities there is a strong sense of hierarchy, with clearly delineated 
identities based on class, religion and ethnicity. While other countries may experience similar 
patterns, as is noted in the other countries analyzed in this chapter, the strongly hierarchical 
organization in the U.S. seems especially pronounced, due to the specific and early established 
framework set up within the immigration law. This can have two contradictory effects on Iraqis 
arriving to the U.S.: First, those that do immigrate to an area of the U.S. that has a large 
community of Iraqis have to play by the rules of the community, which is very hierarchical and 
can be discriminatory against those who do not belong to a specific religious or social network. 
In fact, the communities are also segregated by class, so newer arrivals (especially after 1991), 
while belonging perhaps to the same religious group, are still excluded from certain sections of 
the community. On the other hand, most Iraqis in the U.S. (an estimated 58.3 percent)
114
 do not 
live within a larger Iraqi community, but rather are spread out among the fifty states. Often the 
only contact they may have with other Iraqis is with their own family, if they managed to also 
settle nearby. Therefore, the support structures available through the larger Iraqi religious and 
social networks, which are often instrumental in finding a job, acclimating to an American way 
of life and giving emotional support, may not be available to them. Furthermore, concerning the 
focus of this study, this also means that Iraqi-American diaspora activities, because they are 
based within these communities, may not represent the whole of Iraqis living in the U.S. 
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One form of engagement of Iraqi-Americans with Iraq that has received particular 
attention has been the role of the diaspora in the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq. Kurds and 
Christians, especially those wealthy and well- established in the U.S., cooperated with the U.S. 
government. Kurdish involvement was largely due to their hope for an autonomous Kurdistan, 
which they believed could be created in a post-Saddam Iraq. The Iraqi Reconstruction and 
Development Council (IRDC) was hired by the U.S. Department of State to consult on 
reconstruction issues, and was made up primarily of Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, as well 
as a number of Shi‘a Muslims. The Pentagon consulted with Iraqi-Americans in planning for a 
post-Saddam Iraq: the U.S. Department of Defense held a job fair near Detroit for Iraqi-
Americans to get involved, the former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz met 
with Iraqi-Americans in the Detroit area to speak on his policy and potential military action in 
Iraq,
115
 and many Iraqi-Americans enlisted or joined private contractors as interpreters. In 
addition, Iraqis in the U.S. lent their voices in support of the invasion, giving witness to the 
atrocities of Saddam Hussein‘s regime. One Iraqi-American activist, Emad Dhia, was among 
many Iraqi-Americans to support the war, ―Iraqi-Americans worked very hard for this moment, 
this moment of the truth when President Bush announced on the TV Saddam and his sons must 
leave Iraq within 48 hours.‖116 Others voiced their enthusiasm and desire to return: 
―The reason for all these people—and I‘ve been talking to every single one of 
them—most of them they victimized by Saddam Hussein and his bloody regime. 
Most of these people, me personally, I got two brothers executed back in ‘87.‖ 
Mahdi Altwabaa 
―My dad told me to leave Iraq when I was 14 years old, and I was arrested twice 
because I said something against the government, and it‘s really time to get rid of 
this…it‘s really hard to see him [Saddam Hussein], that he‘s still in power.‖ 
Mohammed Ahmad 
―I think that‘s the duty of every Iraqi who feels that he‘s still tied to that country, 
that‘s his responsibility to…from his position to help in any way that can be 
possible.‖ Samir Shoukri117 
Iraqi-Americans were excited about the prospect of a free and democratic Iraq, and wanted to be 
involved in the reconstruction. They could not have known that the U.S. government was not 
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prepared for post-Saddam Iraq, and that the invasion would lead to civil war and the destruction 
of the very country they worked to liberate. At the same time, since the invasion, certain 
restrictions have been applied to Iraqis who return. Nadje Al-Ali interviewed a woman in the 
Iraqi Shi‘a community in Detroit who returned to Baghdad to help with reconstruction but had 
her Green Card taken away when she returned to the U.S.: ―They asked me a few weeks ago: 
‗Have you ever opposed your government?‘ This is a trick question. If I say no, they will accuse 
me of having been a Ba‘thist, if I say yes, they might not give me U.S. citizenship because I am a 
troublemaker. Am I allowed to be active here? This is a double standard. If you are not a US 
citizen, you do not have the right to speak.‖118 The American government‘s role in preventing or 
facilitating migration has been crucial to the opportunities available for Iraqi-Americans to 
return. If facilitated by the government, return has been encouraged, but has been limited in some 
cases for non-U.S.-citizens, partly due to security concerns. On the other hand, certain activities 
in which members of the diaspora were involved were recognized as non-representative, even at 
the time: ―Said Bremer: ‗I told the G-7 [Iraqi Liberation Council] then that you didn‘t represent 
Iraq. You were exiles. I challenged you to broaden yourselves to include Iraqis who had lived 
here under Saddam, to add women, Christians, Turkmen, and tribal leaders. You agreed to do it, 
but you haven‘t‘.‖119 In this case, it was the members of the diaspora themselves that restricted 
access to the council, refusing to diversify despite the input of an American official, L. Paul 
Bremer, who was in charge of Iraqi reconstruction following the 2003 invasion. 
Despite the emphasis on Iraqis‘ relationship with the U.S. government, there are a 
multitude of Iraqi diaspora organizations and community centers looking to connect Iraqi-
Americans to Iraqis in Iraq and also to others within the U.S. They are primarily organized along 
sectarian divisions, and are also centered on the poles of Detroit and San Diego. Among them 
are: Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services (ACCESS); Arab and Chaldean 
Council; Chaldean National Congress; Iraqi-American House; Karbala Islamic Educational 
Center; Iraqi Medical Sciences Association (IMSA-USA); Iraqi-Islamic Organization in 
America; the Kurdish Community Center of San Diego; and Kurdish Human Rights Watch 
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(KHRW).
120
 These organizations (save for KHRW, which also serves Arabs, Kurds and 
Chaldeans) primarily serve their own ethnic or confessional communities, reinforcing the 
divisions within the Iraqi-American community. 
To conclude, while the Iraqi-American community is strong and active in organizations, 
they are characterized by strong divisions and hierarchy, which manifests itself in the Detroit and 
San Diego communities. Furthermore, their relationship with the U.S. government, particularly 
during and following the 2003 invasion has profoundly affected their opportunities. This affects 
diaspora engagement because not only does each group have their own organization with its own 
priorities and activities, but they also have to deal with limitations based on U.S. policy towards 
non-citizens, within the Arab-American community in particular. The Karbala Islamic 
Educational Center may have different priorities and focus groups than either the Chaldean 
National Congress or the Kurdish Community Center. The Chaldean National Congress would 
come from a different religion, while Kurdish Community Center‘s members would also be 
primarily Muslim, but probably of a different ethnicity than the majority of members within the 
Karbala Islamic Educational Center. All of them, however, would have to be mindful of the 
political climate within the U.S., especially if members are not American citizens. 
 
4.2 The United Kingdom: London, England 
For the United Kingdom, the majority of its Iraqi community is concentrated in London, 
England. This is not surprising, as ―migrants are geographically much more concentrated than 
the UK population as a whole—more than 40 per cent of migrants live in London, making up 
26% of London‘s population.‖121 In 1990 the community was between 70-80,000 persons, but by 
2007 it was estimated at over 100,000.
122
 The majority of Iraqis in the U.K. are Kurdish and/or 
Muslim.
123
 As is typical for Iraqi migrants in Europe, most have come from a higher class and 
educational background, and before 1991 rarely arrived as refugees, as it was easy for those in 
the upper class or upper middle class to get student or employment visas.
124
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Similar to the situation in the U.S., the Iraqi community in London is fairly divided. 
Madawi Al-Rasheed‘s study of the Iraqi community in London confirms: ―Each [Arabs, 
Assyrians, Kurds] has its own community center, voluntary associations, and clubs whose 
members are predominantly from one ethnic group. Upon arrival in Britain, refugees find 
themselves automatically drawn towards their own ethnic group and voluntary associations.‖125 
Although Al-Rasheed highlights the religious and ethnic divisions that play an important role, 
there are also differences based on political orientation, profession, time of arrival and living 
conditions. However, it should be noted that some of these divisions overlap, which is a key 
dynamic when looking at the community. As noted in Chapter 3, certain political, ethnic or 
religious groups left at certain times, so divisions along these lines could also be attributable to 
their time of arrival. Assyrian Christians were among the first Iraqis to arrive in the 1940s and 
1950s after serving for the British in Iraq,
126
 while Kurds arrived largely in the 1970s fleeing the 
violence and persecution directed at Kurds by the B‘ath regime. Various scholars have noted that 
their communities remain generally separate, attributing this to ethnicity and religion; but their 
distinctive experiences in leaving their home country, the differences in immigration status
127
 
and the generational gap are also important features of these groups and reasons for why they 
remain separated in their own groups. 
For the U.K., there have been two waves of Iraqi immigration, of which the Assyrian 
community is exemplar of the first, and the Kurdish community of the second.
128
 The earliest 
wave was composed of those leaving for ideological reasons. After the 1958 revolution, the 
monarchy (which had been supported by the British) bureaucracy came primarily to Britain: 
Sunni upper class professionals, politicians, landowners and those who had served in the British 
army.
129
 During the 1960s, when Iraq was undergoing multiple coups, many intellectuals and 
members of the upper classes came to the U.K. for personal security and a liberal political 
environment. This group was composed of ―exiles [who] had not been directly repressed in Iraq 
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but were members of the professions and intellectuals for whom the political context of Iraq 
under its successive regimes was uncongenial.‖130 For them, ―it was relatively easy…to adjust to 
their new life in Britain. They belonged to the professional middle-class, or in some cases the 
landed gentry of Iraq, who were pushed aside by the nationalization programmes which took 
place in the 1960s.‖131 This group was wealthy and highly educated, and in many cases had 
travelled or studied in foreign countries, including in Europe, and spoke multiple languages. 
Their departure from Iraq was marked by ideological differences, whereas those leaving in the 
second wave are characterized by violence and persecution under the Ba‘th regime. Ba‘th 
repression of opposition groups pushed out Iraqis of different ethnic, religious and social classes. 
Communists, Arab nationalists, Shi‘as, non-Saddam Ba‘thists, Kurds, in essence anyone 
considered opposition, was pressured or forced to leave, and many arrived in the U.K. From 
1982 to 1993, the number of refugees granted asylum in the U.K. increased due to the Iran-Iraq 
War and the Gulf War. While previous arrivals came largely from the upper classes, the refugees 
came from ―a cross-section of Iraqi society, with a greater proportion from the lower classes.‖132 
In spite of this, these refugees were not necessarily poor or poorly educated; most urban Iraqis 
were of the middle class, which was well-developed before the sanctions, and they benefited 
from a fairly developed education system, which was one of the best in the Middle East, until the 
imposition of sanctions. However, their reception in British society was tangibly different from 
the previous arrivals, due in part to the change in British immigration laws that were increasingly 
restrictive regarding asylum seekers. 
 As seen with the Iraqi community in the U.S., the immigration regime in the U.K. has 
had a lasting effect on the evolution of the British-Iraqi community. The U.K. is a traditional 
emigration country, with much emigration centered on settlements in North America and former 
colonies, but has more recently become an immigration country, attracting immigrants 
particularly from the former colonies and the Commonwealth. By 1972, immigrants allowed 
entry must be ―holders of work permits or people with parents or grandparents born in the 
UK‖.133 In 1972, a new Immigration Act entered into force, which still forms the basis of 
immigration law. It ―established a new immigration regime structured around the pillars of 
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limitation and integration‖134 and was far stricter: ―the only immigrants who could enter after the 
enforcement of the 1971 Act (apart from the small proportion who still qualified for a visa on the 
grounds that their skills were in very short supply) were the dependants or fiancés of those 
already settled here, and special categories of UK passport holders such as those in Hong 
Kong.‖135 However, with the increase in the number of asylum seekers from the former Soviet 
Union and former Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 1990s, ―focus shifted towards asylum-seekers, 
with new laws enacted to restrict asylum claims in the U.K.‖136 Therefore, while the earlier 
arrivals of Iraqis may have adjusted ―relatively easily‖ to life in the U.K. due to their intellectual 
background, it may also have been because the immigration regime at the time encouraged their 
integration and path to citizenship. On the other hand, those arriving as refugees from the 1980s 
onwards had to deal with stricter immigration laws, which may have had a negative impact on 
their integration and interaction with the previous wave. More recently there have been even 
more restrictions on immigration and asylum: in 2002, the government expanded economic 
immigration, introducing visas for the highly skilled to enter the U.K. without a job offer, while 
implementing more restrictions for asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, including tougher 
controls and prohibiting asylum seekers from working.
137
 Furthermore, in order to naturalize, 
immigrants must demonstrate ―an adequate level of English (or Welsh, Scottish or Gaelic) and 
‗sufficient knowledge‘ of ‗life in the U.K.‘… Overall, these changes certainly represent a 
significant attempt to restrict the perceived openness of the British model of immigration and 
citizenship.‖138 As immigration and citizenship regulations become stricter, more recent 
immigrants and asylum seekers are often put in a precarious situation, while earlier migrants do 
not have to deal with these new controls. When one examines the British-Iraqi community in 
London, one sees that the majority of leaders of the Iraqi community are British citizens, and the 
community services are used primarily by Iraqis with a permanent status in the U.K.
139
 Thus, 
irregular Iraqi migrants or those without permanent status are not included in most of these 
activities. This suggests that the Iraqi community in London is led by the earliest arrivals and the 
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highly skilled, who have a less-demanding immigration process than those arriving since the 
1980s and/or as refugees. As noted before, these early arrivals were of higher classes and rarely 
arrived as refugees. The predominance of this group in the British Iraqi community can also be 
seen in the preponderance of artistic and political organization in London. 
Due to the well-established Iraqi intellectual community in London, the immigration 
regime in the U.K. and the general trend of high migration to London, much of the Iraqi 
diasporic activities revolve around artistic or political organization in the English capital. Iraqi 
scholar Nadje Al-Ali notes the importance of socializing for Iraqi opposition intellectuals and 
artists in cafes in Camden, London: ―I would eagerly seek out their company, and listen to the 
stories about their lives inside and outside Iraq. We would also discuss novels, films and 
exhibitions, philosophize about this and that, and sometimes exchange news and gossip.‖140 Iraqi 
civil society groups have also been active, particularly in the campaign against the 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion. Furthermore, political, independent, religious and ethnic groups all exist, actively 
working on a range of issues concerning Iraq. The Kurdish Cultural Centre and the Iraqi 
Association (Muntada al-Iraqi) in West London are universally recognized by Iraqi refugees and 
asylum seekers.
141
 Other organizations of particular note are the Women in Black London and 
Act Together (campaigning against war and violence), the Iraqi Women‘s League (IWL), the 
Iraqi Prospect Organization, the Assyrian Club of London and the Shi‘i al-Khu‘i Foundation. 
Although there are some Iraqi organizations outside of London they tend to lack financial 
support and do not function well.
142
  
Therefore, while the British-Iraqi community is characterized by a large amount of civil 
society activity, it is led by the earliest arrivals and tends to exclude those without permanent 
status (most notably asylum seekers). Furthermore, access is restricted for those living outside of 
London. The organization of this community and its activities is a function of the ethnic, 
religious and socio-economic make-up of the different waves of migration to the U.K. together 
with the restrictive trend in immigration controls, a particular hardship for the more recent 
arrivals.  
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4.3 Iran 
The bulk of Iraqi asylum-seekers have found refuge in Iran, partially due to its geographic 
proximity, but also because of its Shi‘a religious rule. In fact, it has been the second base for 
political exiles, alongside London. In 2003, Iran was host to 202,000 Iraqi refugees, although this 
probably does not include those Iraqis deported to Iran from Iraq over the course of decades.
143
 
Many of these refugees chose to return to Iraq in 2003. Nevertheless, between 2006 and 2008, at 
the height of the violence, more than 4,000 Iraqis migrated (or for some perhaps, re-migrated) to 
Iran.
144
 Some Iraqi Shi‘as have chosen Iran because they feel a sense of religious affinity with 
the country. The city of Qom is central to numerous Shi‘a schools of thought and there are 
established networks with religious groups in Damascus and Lebanon,
145
 which makes the 
country particularly appealing for the devout. 
However, the majority of Iraqi refugees in Iran arrived because they were forcibly moved 
there during Saddam‘s regime under the pretense that they were of Iranian origin. As mentioned 
in Section 3.1, Shi‘a Muslims were targeted and expelled from Iraq from 1969 onwards, 
beginning with the Fayli Kurds, a Shi‘a minority within the Sunni Kurdish population. They, 
along with economic elites and those of in the middle class considered a threat—anyone 
considered of Iranian origin, even if they had no ties to the country—were deported to Iran. In 
addition, about 40-60,000 Marsh Arabs managed to flee to Iran during and after the drainage of 
the marshes from 1991 to 1995.
146
 This population was largely rural, with strong kinship systems 
and low education levels. At the same time, refugees fled to Iran en masse following the 1991 
Shi‘a uprisings that were brutally suppressed. These Iraqis were from the middle class and urban 
areas such as Basra, Nasiriya and Amarah but lacked the social base to allow them access to the 
labor market.
147
 They moved to Iran to work, accumulate capital and in some cases try to further 
migrate to the West by taking advantage of connections to the growing Shi‘a diaspora networks 
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in liberal asylum countries in Europe, North America or Australia.
148
 Concerning those arriving 
in the 1990s, there was a high proportion of the elderly, children and women, as hundreds of 
thousands of adult men died during the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, and the repression of 
Marsh Arabs specifically targeted adult men. Iran naturalized about 100,000 of these Iraqis, 
while the rest largely remained stateless refugees.
149
 
 The Iraqi community in Iran, therefore, has been made up of those who were forcibly 
removed as they were considered a threat to Ba‘th power or did not fit in to the regime‘s concept 
of Iraqi national identity (i.e. Kurds, as they are not of Arab ethnicity). They have received 
refugee status, and those who were stateless have the right to their Iraqi citizenship again after 
2003, but they still remain in a very vulnerable community. Although Iran was host to a number 
of political and intellectual Iraqis (including Nouri al-Maliki, the current Prime Minister of Iraq) 
and certain portions of the urban middle classes, the majority has been low-skilled, and has not 
yet experienced the kind of return discussed here on a noticeable scale. Therefore, Section 5.4 on 
Iraqi re-engagement from neighboring countries does not apply to Iran, but rather, primarily 
Syria and Jordan. However, it has been briefly included in this chapter as it has been an 
important host country for Iraqis, especially the current Iraqi political elite. 
 
4.4 Syria: Damascus 
Syria has a population of 22.5 million,
150
 and hosts arguably the largest Iraqi resident population, 
estimated at over a million. The majority have settled in the Damascus area after 2003. However, 
Iraqis have been migrating to Syria since the 1970s. In the beginning, Syria served primarily as a 
transit country for Iraqis migrating to western or socialist bloc countries, but they tended not to 
settle, instead moving onwards after a few months.
151
 But after 1992 the migration scheme 
changed, with the poorest migrants (who were still not the poorest Iraqis, as they could afford to 
leave Iraq) staying in Syria and the richer ones continuing on to Europe, North America or 
Australia.
152
 Following the US invasion in 2003, many Iraqis in Syria returned to Iraq, hoping to 
play a role in the reconstruction, but with the increase in violence most were forced to emigrate 
again. They were joined by a new wave of Iraqi refugees.  
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In 2007, of the two million Iraqis seeking protection in neighboring countries, about 1.5 
million of them were in Syria.
153
 The majority of the new Iraqi migrants are urban, coming 
especially from Baghdad, but also fleeing violence in many other urban areas: Sunni Iraqis from 
Baghdad, Anbar, Salah ad-Dir and Sunni cities and neighborhoods in general; Christians from 
Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra; Mandeans from Baghdad, Basra, Amara and Nasiriya; Kurds, 
although few in number due to the stability in Kurdistan, left in larger numbers between April 
and May 2007 due to tensions between the Turkish President and the President of the Kurdish 
Regional Governate.
154
 Because these refugees tend to be urban, they also tend to be middle 
class, educated and have some savings on which they can depend while living in Syria. Some 
have also bought housing space, established businesses and put money into the Syrian economy, 
despite the fact that they do not have large funds at their disposal.
155
 Like many Iraqi refugees, 
those in Syria have left to escape violence, because they were at risk, and for a better economic, 
family and health care situation. This new wave is closed off from the Iraqi arrivals pre-2003 
because their motives for leaving are different and the earlier migrants want to avoid being 
grouped together with the new arrivals.
156
 New arrivals are viewed as a disruption to Syrian 
society because of their large numbers, their inflationary effect on the housing market, and their 
detrimental effect on services. In addition, Iraqis are blamed for increased crime rate. Fagen 
argues:  
―Syria is a country with a socialist ideology and, until recently, with an 
economically more homogeneous population. The combined effects of the 
economic modernization on the one hand, and the inflation on the other have 
shifted this equation. Even if the changes are not yet dramatic, more Syrians are 
declining into poverty, more are involved in crime (as are Iraqis), and the spread 
between rich and poor is greater.‖157 
For Syrians, the cost of living has gone up and poorer Syrians feel marginalized in their own 
cities. However, at the same time, the new immigrants have led economic growth and established 
a more market-based economy in the country: Iraqi purchases of real estate have brought profits 
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to Syrians.
158
 This discussion of the weight Iraqis pose on the system is also taking place in 
Jordan. 
 This belief that Iraqi immigration has destroyed Syrian services is related to the special 
rights granted to Iraqis in Syria. In Iraq, Syria, Jordan and many other Arab countries,
159
 Arab 
immigrants are not considered foreigners by the country, and are not referred to as ―refugees‖ 
within these host countries.
160
 Rather, they are considered ―guests‖, with the right to buy 
property, establish businesses, invest and settle in the country. This tradition stems from the idea 
of ―Arab brotherhood‖,161 which offers a haven for all Arab brothers, while also avoiding 
political complications that would arise from granting refugee status to citizens of neighboring 
countries: ―For Syrian legislation the world is thus divided into three categories: Syrian national, 
Arabs and foreigners (ajānib).‖162 Arabs receive temporary residence permits, usually for three 
months, but longer-term and permanent residence permits, as well as citizenship, are still very 
difficult to obtain. In Syria this tradition is particularly established, ―Visitors from neighboring 
Arab countries may send their children to schools, use health facilities, and buy properties and 
businesses.‖163 This right, therefore, applies to Iraqis, who enter as tourists and can use services 
in Syria that are all but destroyed in Iraq, an important reason for migration to Syria. Even if an 
Iraqi immigrant overstays his or her temporary permit and is thus in the country illegally, he or 
she is still allowed access to these services: Iraqis can attend public schools, enroll in universities 
for free and use Syrian health care. However, this tradition establishes the immigrants as 
temporary; governments continually refer to Iraqis as ―guests‖, with the view of returning them 
to Iraq as soon as the situation allows it. Therefore, there are not government plans to integrate 
Iraqis into Syria, and no consultation or cooperation with the Iraqi community in Syria as has 
been noted in the Iraqi-American diaspora. 
Aside from the immigration regime, Syria is a prime host country because of its 
geographic proximity, relatively simple entry requirements,
164
 common language,
165
 low cost of 
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living, presence of family and friends nearby and easy access to services. Residence permits are 
easier to attain in Syria, almost universally granted to Iraqis registered with UNHCR.
166
 As of 
the end of July 2010, there were 151,907 Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR in Syria, and as 
of November 2008 there were 1.2 million Iraqi residents in Syria with valid visas.
167
 The lower 
cost of living and the more accessible labor market (in comparison to other host countries) is 
appealing to poorer refugees, although they still have enough social and economic capital to 
leave Iraq, so they are not of the poorest strata. Furthermore, services (education and health 
services in particular) are more open to Iraqis in Syria than in other host countries, which has 
become especially important due to the profoundly deteriorated situation of education and health 
systems in Iraq. For pregnant women and families, this promise of safe and reliable services 
would be an especially strong pull. 
 In addition to the importance of access to the labor market and services, Syria is 
considered a safe haven for those suffering from religious persecution. Christians and Shi‘a 
Muslims are overrepresented in migration to Syria, having fled persecution in Iraq. There are 
significant Assyrian and Chaldean Christian communities in particular. Many left in the 1990s in 
response to the economic crises and Saddam Hussein‘s campaigns encouraging sectarianism. For 
many, Syria continued to be a transit country from which Iraqis could migrate to a third country: 
―Assyrians left from 1991 onwards to rejoin family members in America, Australia, or the UK 
through legal means...[but the] trend ended towards 1993, when those who were still in Syria had 
no family links.‖168 After 2003, an even larger proportion of Christians arrived in Syria as they 
were targeted for multiple reasons: payment of the jizya tax for all non-Muslims; their lack of 
traditional tribal connections (save for the Yadizis of the north); having served the regime, even 
just as government employees; being associated with the international presence; their livelihood 
which allowed alcohol and more lenient rules for women; and the increasing frequency of church 
bombings.
169
 
Moreover, Syria is often preferable to Jordan, as the road to Amman passes through the 
Anbar governate, which has been especially violent, and the border guards in Jordan ask the 
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migrant whether he or she is Sunni or Shi‘a, a humiliating situation for Shi‘a Muslims (Jordan is 
majority Sunni).
170
 Syria, although secular, is majority Sunni, but has significant minorities of 
Allowite Muslims, Shi‘as, Christians and Druze.171 Syria‘s diversity is important for Iraqis 
wanting to migrate to the country; Iraqis can find coreligionists in their host country. In June 
2007, the Brookings Institute and University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement outlined 
six reasons why Shi‘a Iraqi Muslims migrate to Syria (majority Sunni) instead of Iran (majority 
Shi‘a and a Shi‘a religious state) or Southern Iraq (majority Shi‘a): (1) there are better economic 
conditions and more work opportunities in Syria; (2) they eventually want asylum or 
resettlement in third countries; (3) they are urban and religiously moderate or secular, so don‘t 
want to live under strict religious laws; (4) for the preceding six months the southern governates 
had restricted entry because they were overloaded with immigration; (5) intra-Shi‘a tension and 
fighting in southern Iraq is unappealing for those fleeing violence; and (6) many are more 
comfortable in an Arab country (whereas Iran is Persian).
172
 Syria has a better reputation among 
Iraqis. An Iraqi woman interviewed who lived and worked in Syria before moving to the U.S. as 
a refugee noted her positive experience in the country, and compared it with her experience in 
the U.S.: ―I don‘t know anyone here. I feel threatened sometimes. In Syria, we have the same 
culture, church and people. We feel we are at home. Here [the U.S.] we need more than that—
how they think, their culture is different. I don‘t know the rules.‖173 Although she was grateful to 
be in the U.S., because of the safety and the support accorded to her and her family, she felt a 
certain affinity for Syria, stressing that for her, Syria felt like home. 
Furthermore, the community in Syria has contact more often with Iraq. Daily cell phone 
calls, frequent contact via the internet, letters sent back and forth between the countries via bus 
and taxi drivers or friends, and return trips are all common ways Iraqis in Syria communicate 
with their family and friends back home.
174
 However, despite their cross-border activities, they 
remain largely within their own Iraqi neighborhoods and communities in Syria, which are 
basically self-sufficient. In fact, they find little need or motivation to connect with Syrian 
communities and Chatelard notes that the Iraqi community in Syria is not truly transnational, as 
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they rarely interact with Syrian society.
175
 Iraqis in Syria have benefitted from a fairly lenient 
immigration regime and access to services that would not necessarily be available to them in 
other countries. However, increasing pressure on an already weak infrastructure and services, 
particularly in Damascus, has led to a negative backlash, with Syrians responding disfavorably to 
Iraqi immigrants and immigration controls getting stricter. 
 
4.5 Jordan: Amman 
Jordan is host to the second-largest Iraqi community, with estimates ranging from 450,000 to 
800,000,
176
 but has a longer history than that of Syria, whose Iraqi guests arrived primarily after 
2003. The Iraqi community in Jordan is also much less visible than in Syria: there are not 
specifically Iraqi meeting or community centers in Amman, although there are many Iraqi 
businesses and restaurants. Jordan has also operated under a similar immigration system to Syria, 
accepting Iraqis as ―Arab brothers.‖ Therefore, most Iraqis currently in Jordan enter as guests 
with temporary permits. However, it is currently very difficult for them to gain permanent status 
or citizenship (the latter of which is the case in many Arab countries), although before the 1990s, 
many second or third generation Iraqis living in Jordan were granted Jordanian citizenship.
177
 In 
addition, to renew or attain residence permits, foreigners entering the country who are not 
investing in enterprises must prove that they can support themselves by depositing nearly 
US$150,000 in a Jordanian bank, and need to maintain about half of that to earn interest.
178
 So, 
while Jordan still allows immigration, and maintains a policy of non-refoulement of refugees, it 
has become stricter regarding Iraqi immigrants, at times even expelling migrants considered 
―undesirable‖179 i.e. not highly educated or wealthy. This policy came about primarily after 
2005, in response to terrorist attacks in Amman in November 2005, coordinated by Iraqis 
associated with Al Qaeda, and the subsequent discovery of several terrorist cells operating in 
Jordan with links to Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq‘s increasing ties to Iran, the establishment of 
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terrorists in Iraq and the overwhelming domination of Shi‘as in the government add to Jordan‘s 
concerns: ―It is particularly worrisome because, as so often occurs, the conflict has enhanced the 
power of extremists and fundamentalists in Iraq and all but eliminated the spaces available to 
advocates of tolerance and co-existence.‖180 Therefore, Iraq‘s instability is a serious concern for 
this neighbor, and has directly affected its immigration policies. This new dynamic has 
fundamentally changed Jordan‘s relationship with its Iraqi residents and Iraq, as there has been a 
long history of friendly and cooperative relations. 
The Iraqi community in Jordan is dominated by Sunnis (68%), with a smaller percentage 
of Shi‘a (17%, the majority of Iraqi Shi‘as having migrated to Syria) and Christians (12%).181 It 
consists of the wealthy or upper class elite, especially those who were close to the regime, but 
also poor refugees and thousands of the middle class. Jordan has been a center for Iraqi 
businessmen and their families, and the economic elite use Amman as a base. These groups can 
maintain a high standard of living and travel around the world, or, as is often the case, can use 
Amman as a base from which family living in Iraq, Jordan, the U.S., the U.K. and other parts of 
the world can meet and exchange. 
Migration to Jordan on a larger scale started after the 1958 overthrow of the monarchy. 
Many members of the Hashemite dynasty and the monarchy bureaucracy came to Jordan, as 
Jordan was (and continues to be) ruled by the Hashemite monarchy, similarly set up by the 
British. From the 1960s to the 1980s, Iraqis continued to migrate to Jordan to escape persecution 
under subsequent coups and the Ba‘th regime. However, the majority of Iraqis came to Jordan as 
entrepreneurs; wealthy Iraqis of all political affiliations invested in Jordanian business and real 
estate. This movement continued during the Gulf War and the period of sanctions in Iraq, as the 
Iraq-Jordan border stayed open, due to Jordan‘s support of Iraq during the first Gulf War and 
continued economic relations. In fact, Jordan became the strongest economic partner of Iraq 
during sanctions, receiving highly subsidized oil from the country. This relationship allowed a 
unique opportunity for Iraqi private sector entrepreneurs, who ―used Amman as a base for their 
regional activities and for wider international strategies.‖182 Because of the open border, men, 
goods and capital were able to pass back and forth between Iraq and Jordan. Under sanctions, the 
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political and economic elite would come to Jordan for access to services (i.e. health, banking) 
and markets (i.e. art) not available in Iraq, not necessarily staying in Jordan but often circulating 
back and forth.
183
 Chatelard has enumerated four groups of Iraqis who migrated to Jordan 
between 1990 and 2002: 1) Refugees leaving in anticipation or because of the first Gulf War 
conflict. This group was demographically heterogeneous, but primarily urbanites of the upper-
middle class who already had connections in Jordan or members of the middle class with enough 
means to (as they expected) temporarily migrate to Jordan until the end of the conflict; 2) Those 
who already had experience with international migration, had capital and assets outside of Iraq 
and did not wait for the outcome of the conflict to leave; 3) Single men as labor migrants to other 
Arab countries—Jordan granted 15,000 to 20,000 residency permits connected to work contracts; 
and 4) Families leaving for destinations in the U.K., North America and Australia, where they 
already had relatives.
184
 As can be seen in these categories, these migrants were primarily of the 
upper and middle classes, with a significant amount of social, educational and economic capital. 
Economic capital was especially important as migrants had to pay large sums for permission to 
leave the country and for travel documents. This intelligentsia was made up of those highly 
qualified in industrial or technical fields, members of professions not closely associated with the 
regime looking for better salaries as sanctions destroyed their purchasing power
185
: doctors, 
surgeons, engineers, lawyers, teachers, journalists, artists and translators, among others. Some of 
those that settled in Jordan brought over their families, but more often they supported family still 
in Iraq through remittances. Most of the Iraqis in Jordan already had members of their close 
family in Europe, North America, Australia, and/or other Arab countries, and were typically 
Arab Iraqis coming from the center and the south.
186
 But starting in 1993, it became increasingly 
difficult to leave as financial capacity in Iraq was severely reduced and Arab countries began 
closing their labor markets—Libya, Yemen and Jordan are among the countries to stop recruiting 
labor—so Iraqis would often overstay their permits in Jordan, working in the informal labor 
market well below their high qualifications.
187
 In the late 1990s, families leaving for Western 
countries became increasingly important, and Jordan became more of a transit country for those 
waiting to migrate through family or community chain migration. Jordan‘s Iraqi community 
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grew to approximately 300,000
188
 before 2003, making it the largest host of Iraqis during 
Saddam Hussein‘s regime. 
After the dissolution of the Ba‘th regime, many Iraqis in Jordan chose to return to help 
rebuild the country. They felt that they had a role to play in the new Iraq as teachers, university 
professors, doctors, lawyers—using the skills they had developed in Iraq and abroad—and were 
involved in charities, humanitarian issues and women‘s rights projects.189 However, as violence 
erupted and the country devolved into chaos, most of these members of the diaspora retreated 
back to Jordan. At the same time, many Iraqis chose to migrate to Jordan immediately after the 
fall of the regime because they already had assets in the country. The first migrants to Jordan 
after 2003 were Sunni, often Ba‘thists fleeing the country, but with the escalation of violence, 
Shi‘as began arriving as well. However, the preference for the well-educated and wealthy 
continued:  
Iraqis with resources to invest have undertaken projects with generous terms, and 
have become important and very visible business owners and property holders. 
Importantly, investments in business and/or employment in jobs deemed 
economically important to Jordan—such as university professors—not only 
ensure livelihoods but also provide a path to legal status based on yearly, 
renewable residence permits. Only those Iraqis able to invest in Jordanian 
enterprises or who are employed in fields deemed to be of national interest have 
been able to obtain long term status. The investment entitles them to receive 
yearly residence permits, to seek employment in specified fields, send their 
children to schools and access public services.
190
 
The acquisition of long-term status in Jordan is crucial, as mobility is limited without a 
permanent residence permit—if you leave the country, you may not be allowed in again without 
permanent status. The number of Iraqis with permanent residence permits is currently estimated 
at 25,000, and UNHCR has said that 29% of those registered with them have such a permit.
191
 At 
the same time, it has become nearly impossible for Iraqis to integrate into the workforce, 
although Iraqi investors will sometimes reserve some of their employment for other Iraqis, 
referred through social networks. While the migrants continue to be highly skilled, most end up 
working in jobs well below their skill level, a notable ―brain waste‖ of Iraqi skills. The Jordanian 
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government has not as of yet worked to integrate these members into the economy, especially as 
it continues to view them as ―guests‖ who should leave as soon as the situation in Iraq is 
alleviated. Therefore, those who do have residence permits and are allowed to leave and re-enter 
the country are almost exclusively those of the upper classes and/or with unique skills.  
Since most Iraqis are not employed, or are informally employed, the majority live off of 
savings, aid from community organizations or transfers from Iraq. Christian Iraqis receive 
support from Jordanian churches and the larger Christian community.
192
 Forty-two percent of 
Iraqis in Jordan receive transfers from Iraq.
193
 This means that, although they are skilled and 
were of the middle to upper class in Iraq, most are now in a precarious situation, vulnerable to 
both the exhaustion of their savings and the volatile situation in Iraq that may disrupt transfers. 
Furthermore, Jordanian services are not available to Iraqis without a permanent status. Until 
August 2007, Iraqi children of unregistered residents were not allowed to attend public schools 
(in contrast with Syria‘s policy). However, King Abdullah II changed this position, putting aside 
large funds for expansion of the education system: hiring teachers, buying school materials, 
building schools and renovating classrooms in anticipation of the large number of Iraqi children 
of unregistered migrants.
194
 Although this represents a positive step, Jordanians still tend to view 
Iraqis as the cause of their problems: high prices, expensive housing, inflation, deteriorating 
services and infrastructure, crime and traffic. During Fagen and Jarrah‘s research in Amman in 
2007, every Jordanian they interviewed ―singled out the rapidly accelerating cost of housing and 
most blamed wealthy Iraqis for having purchased or rented available space‖ despite the fact that 
Jordanians are the highest investors, and Iraqis are the fourth-largest foreign investors, after 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.
195
 This scapegoating places the blame for 
Jordanian problems squarely on the shoulders of Iraqis in Jordan, an already vulnerable group. 
Unfortunately, this tendency only grows stronger with continued economic woes. Coupled with 
increasing difficulty in crossing the border, obtaining residence permits and gaining access to 
services, as well as the expulsion of certain Iraqis from Jordan, the Iraqi community in Jordan is 
under intense pressure to either continue migrating to another country or to return to Iraq, and 
their diaspora activities have been severely limited. In fact, independent civil society 
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organizations are notably absent, although activists (especially women) travel to Jordan from 
Iraq for meetings and conferences.
196
 So, although there is some circular migration of Iraqi 
activists and members of the diaspora between Iraq and Jordan, their participation in diaspora 
activities has been limited, and, in fact, discouraged primarily due to security concerns. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the main characteristics of and forces affecting the Iraqi communities 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, Iran, Syria and Jordan. Each community has 
developed in a unique way depending on the backgrounds of the migrant group and the 
immigration regime of the host country. This development has affected the power relations 
within the Iraqi communities as well as between the Iraqi community and their hosts, with 
certain hierarchies created or reinforced due to the immigration regime of the host country and 
the immigration statuses of the migrants. Davies‘ analysis of the various forms of domination 
and subordination that affect power relations is particularly useful when examining Iraqi 
communities. She recognizes that inequalities are built upon spatial, socio-economic, identity 
and political differences, which have their own inherent hierarchies but also overlap.
197
 She 
emphasizes the importance of changing opportunities and constraints within these power 
hierarchies for diasporic activities. These opportunities and constraints can be viewed as based 
on a particular person or group‘s access to power. In the Iraqi case this analysis is especially 
useful, as the development of the Iraqi diaspora has hinged upon power relations at different 
times and within various spaces. It is particularly telling that in the U.S. and the U.K., the first 
arrivals affected the make-up and organization of the community, and often continue to be the 
leaders of the community. This is due in part to the immigration regimes of the host countries, 
which have stressed family and skilled migration, a development that has supported the 
organizational structure of the first arrivals. Furthermore, Iraqis in the U.S. were given particular 
attention due to the 2003 invasion, as the U.S. government looked to the Iraqi diaspora to help 
garner support. But with this attention, there were still hierarchies: those that were more 
established and wealthy within the Iraqi-American diaspora played a bigger role, Christian and 
Kurdish witnesses to Saddam‘s atrocities were given the most attention, those not supportive of 
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the invasion were excluded from the discussions, and those who had permanent status within the 
U.S. had greater freedom of movement to return after 2003. In contrast, the first Iraqi arrivals to 
Syria and Jordan have separated themselves from the new arrivals. Iraqis in Syria, who are in a 
much more vulnerable position, have not even been given the opportunity to speak on Syrian 
policies towards Iraq. In fact, if they are illegally residing in the country, they would need to take 
care that they were not noticed by the government, remaining silent to ensure their safety.  
The differences observed in the role of the various waves within Iraqi diaspora politics 
could be seen solely as a function of numbers: the first arrivals in the U.S. and the U.K. are more 
prevalent than the newer arrivals, while the Iraqi communities in Syria and Jordan are dominated 
by newer arrivals. However, this overlooks the significance of power in creating these 
differences. Earlier arrivals tend to be more established in the new community, and so they may 
not identify or want to be identified with the newer arrivals; first arrivals would have more 
permanent residence status, employment and perhaps children integrated into the host 
community. They also tended to leave before economic sanctions, suggesting that their 
experience was characterized more by choice than economic imperative. Furthermore, the role of 
Iraqi-Americans in the 2003 invasion represents a particular opportunity in time when Iraqi-
American goals corresponded with a global power‘s goals, providing the chance for diaspora 
engagement. In Syria and Jordan, however, the Iraqi community is dominated by newer arrivals 
post-sanctions and especially post-2003, who tend to be poorer (although still wealthy enough to 
leave Iraq), putting them in a precarious situation. Also, regional politics represented by the 
policy of ―Arab brotherhood‖ restrict the role that Iraqis can play within Syrian or Jordanian 
policies. Finally, these diasporas interact with each other and with Iraqis that have not left Iraq. 
The Iraqi-Americans who supported the 2003 invasion impacted the current Iraqi diaspora 
communities in neighboring countries because they tended to leave post-2003 as Iraq became 
unstable and plagued by violence, due to the U.S.-led invasion. Also, the Iraqi diaspora tends to 
have a higher socio-economic level than those who stayed in Iraq, as one needs a certain level of 
capital (social, cultural and economic) in order to afford leaving the country. 
These power relations could affect the developmental potential of the diaspora. For 
example, Shi‘a Muslim Iraqi-Americans have been particularly outspoken about their sense of 
entitlement in the new post-Saddam Iraq, due to their persecution by the regime. Their work 
within Iraq may encourage sectarian divisions and tensions by stressing Shi‘a-specific 
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persecution while dismissing that of others.
198
 This would hinder development goals in Iraq by 
fueling religious and ethnic divisions, which are currently extremely volatile. Kurds, too, work 
towards their own goals: in particular, an autonomous Kurdish state. Therefore, their work in 
Iraq would focus on the separation of Kurdistan from the rest of Iraq, a movement that would 
have important developmental consequences for the rest of Iraq. Each group often favors those 
from their own group, encouraging favoritism and further separation along religious and ethnic 
lines. The next section will look more closely at the return activity of Iraqis from abroad within 
the context of development programs, paying particular attention to the inequalities at play and 
how they affect these programs.  
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Chapter 5: Return 
 
From the interviews and the literature, two types of organized return of the highly skilled stood 
out among the ways of return: consultancies organized through international programs and short 
trips taken through individual initiative for work-related, personal or familial reasons. This thesis 
focuses specifically on skilled Iraqis living abroad, who have returned temporarily to Iraq to 
work as consultants or for other professional reasons, e.g. to maintain businesses, start NGOs, or 
attend Parliamentary sessions. The majority of the organized return has been for consultancies, 
although there has been a significant amount of individually-organized return for professional 
reasons. However, there are not numbers for this latter group, and the majority of the literature 
on this form of diaspora engagement focuses on official consultancies organized by international 
organizations or governments. It is very difficult, and perhaps impossible to measure the 
developmental impact of these programs: ―Most development projects are measured by little 
more than a summary of financial accounting‖199. Still, ―individual volunteers, program 
organizers, and development agencies may have different ideas about what constitutes a 
successful programmatic outcome.‖200 Therefore, while this study speaks to development issues, 
it is not feasible at the moment to measure the precise developmental impact on Iraq. However, 
by focusing on the role that specific members of the diaspora have within the context of their 
background and the program, it is possible to see how they affect these development projects. In 
the following section, various forms of temporary return will be analyzed by discussing the 
traditional format for organized consultancies and findings from interviews, two specific 
international programs (Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq and the Local Governance Program) and the 
transnational engagement of Iraqis returning to Iraq temporarily, primarily from Jordan and 
Syria. These forms of return are exemplary of the ways in which skilled Iraqis living abroad have 
tangibly engaged in development through temporary return migration to Iraq. 
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5.1 Temporary Return Migration 
As Faist has noted: ―temporary returns, visits and other forms of transactions have moved to the 
centre of attention.‖, with a particular focus on skilled migrants, because ―while many of those 
categorized as highly skilled do not return to the regions of origin, they nonetheless form border-
crossing epistemic networks and associations‖.201 Many different governments and international 
organizations have organized programs to encourage the return of expatriates living abroad, to 
tap their apparent skills and networks. These programs have operated on three particular 
assumptions: ―(1) that migrants have learned something abroad and have acquired experience; 
(2) that what they have learned is useful in their home context; and (3) that migrants are willing 
and able to apply what they have gained abroad.‖202 Therefore, in respective national contexts, 
professionals will be recruited from the diaspora for different capacity-building projects. These 
activities could include developing plans for construction of needed facilities (e.g. water tanks), 
offering advice to businesses, working to expand the public health and education sector, and 
offering policy advice. Most of the programs are modeled after the UNDP‘s TOKTEN program, 
which, beginning in 1977, organized voluntary returns of expatriates to their home countries to 
counter the effects of the ―brain drain‖ on developing countries. The use of TOKTEN as a model 
can be particularly noticed in regard to the Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq Program and the Local 
Governance Program, discussed below. TOKTEN is not centralized, but rather is organized 
within each country, in coordination with UNDP and UNESCO projects, as well as the 
respective country‘s needs.203 It links expatriates with particular institutions (governmental, 
academic, private and NGO), funding their return trip and stay. Aaron Terrazas outlines 
TOKTEN‘s main objectives: ―To lower the cost of technical advice; To allow developing 
countries to gain access to consultants who would be more effective than other consultants due to 
their linguistic or cultural competencies; To seed potential return of skilled expatriates or their 
long-term engagement with their country of origin; To depoliticize development-oriented 
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volunteer work as the aegis of UNDP allows political autonomy.‖204 The basic features of each 
program has been: the setting up of a database of potential volunteers for outreach purposes; 
volunteer requirements (e.g. expatriate nationals and not second generations, over age 25, at least 
a Bachelor‘s diploma, excellence in the field, and minimum five years of experience); 
recognition of the specific country‘s needs (decided upon by a committee of UNDP 
representatives and government agencies); and the completion of the expatriate‘s consultancy 
(funded by TOKTEN).
205
 The targeting of the highly skilled with high levels of experience aims 
to bring the most valuable expatriates, with whom they then try to encourage a longer-term 
engagement, even though the consultancies are usually only a few months. The recruitment of 
specialists means that they are largely from the ―Global North‖ (i.e. Western Europe and North 
America), whose institutions are more widely recognized and where there is more frequent 
access to the newest technologies. In the case of Iraq, it is also these regions that tend to have the 
strongest networks.  
Nonetheless, the TOKTEN programs have evolved over the years, and have changed 
based on the country. In addition, other programs that have been based on the TOKTEN program 
have adopted some principles and not others. For example, governmental programs often 
organize the work around government aims, which may contradict TOKTEN‘s objective to 
―depoliticize development-oriented volunteer work.‖ Furthermore, some engagement of 
expatriates has the explicit goal of permanent return, although originally the program 
emphasized temporary return. The TOKTEN programs are relevant not only because they serve 
as the model for other programs recruiting expatriates, but also because they operate under the 
same assumptions: that the recruitment of expatriates will aid the development of the home 
country. This idea is based on the belief that expatriates will bring skills to the country for a 
fraction of the cost of and far more effectively than non-expatriate consultants. 
 However, this is not always the case. As Fagen says: ―Cultural sensitivities may persist, 
but cultural and political realities change over time.‖206 Ammassari has highlighted the duality of 
engagement of highly skilled expatriates: ―…development impacts of return migration depend on 
the attitudes of the receivers as much as upon the efforts of the proponents. If attention is 
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exclusively focused on migrants and on assisting them in resettling back home, such policy 
measures may produce some undesirable side effects.‖207 In particular, focus on expatriates often 
elicits negative reactions from those who have not left.
208
 As far as the cost factor for engaging 
expatriates, the original practice was that remuneration would be lower than in developed 
countries, and on par with consultancy services within the developing country—in line with the 
idea of the program more as volunteering. This has changed over time, with certain programs 
granting wages for expatriates much higher than those in the home country, e.g. in Sudan and 
Rwanda.
209
 This may lead to resentment by those in the home country working side by side with 
the expatriates; they may view the expatriates as disloyal, as they abandoned their home country, 
and are thus unworthy of higher wages than those who did not leave.
210
 Furthermore, these 
programs do not account for expatriates who may be ready to make fully voluntary contributions. 
On the other hand, in countries such as Sudan and Rwanda, and other countries recovering from 
civil wars (like Iraq), higher remuneration may be necessary to offset the very real security 
concerns plaguing the country. 
 More concerning is the emphasis on the particular knowledge that expatriates have of 
their home country, which is argued to ease the implementation of development projects. The 
diaspora‘s knowledge of their respective home country‘s culture, body and verbal language, and 
ability to blend into the population, have been cited as reasons for the effectiveness of diaspora 
consultants. Various studies have found that diaspora volunteers have been more effective, have 
needed less pre-departure or post-arrival orientation, and cost less, as the volunteer may still have 
friends or family in the home country who could house them.
211
 However, this does not account 
for the specific problems expatriates pose. In particular, the length of time away from the country 
may affect their cultural and linguistic knowledge, as the country has changed over time. This is 
especially true for those who have been away from the country for decades, or second- or higher-
generations. In fact, ten to fifteen years of absence has been argued as the maximum for the 
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effectiveness of diaspora members in their home country.
212
 In the case of Iraq especially, local 
Iraqis would be able to recognize an expatriate from language alone. One expatriate interviewed 
for this thesis who left Iraq in the 1970s mentioned that, although Iraqis would recognize that he 
was a fellow national, they would know he had lived abroad for a long time, as the language has 
evolved and the emigrant may have also forgotten some words. Furthermore, Iraq has undergone 
major changes over the past 50 years, and expatriates may no longer have up-to-date information 
on the country, and may have radically different opinions concerning religion, development or 
the role of the welfare state (just to name a few). In these cases, a volunteer from neighboring 
Syria or Jordan may be just as useful. In addition, favoritism can play a big role, especially 
within a divided diaspora like that from Iraq. If not recognized or checked, an expatriate may 
recruit primarily members of his or her own community, as networks are used to recruit potential 
returnees: ―Solon Ardittis of ILO points to the potential for patronage and favoritism in diaspora 
volunteer programs that allow host organizations to select volunteers based on personal 
connections rather than merit.‖213 Finally, Bob Awuor of the African Community Development 
Foundation has cited ―‗diaspora distractions,‘ or personal or family concerns, [that] can 
sometimes consume diaspora volunteers while on assignment.‖214 
 The contradictions inherent in the use of members of the diaspora are supported by the 
analysis of interviews conducted for this thesis.
215
 What has emerged from the interviews and the 
literature is that the Iraqi expatriates that were recruited each had different motivations for 
returning, views of the home country and ideas about what should be the priority in encouraging 
development in Iraq. As Faist has noted: ―geographically mobile persons who do not 
permanently reside in the community of origin may hold different notions of development from 
those ‗at home.‘‖216 In fact, different interviewees stressed corruption, services, justice, 
education, political issues and expansion of the private sector as the priority for Iraqi 
development. While one‘s background does not automatically determine one‘s priorities, it can 
offer interesting insight. For example, the Iraqi who stressed justice was Christian, and expressed 
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concern for minorities in Iraq. The person who highlighted the role of the private sector for a 
vibrant economy works for an independent think tank in the U.S. Those who had a teaching 
background mentioned the role of education, and each person contacted living in the U.S. 
stressed the importance of fighting corruption. This reflects the importance of identity and 
exposure to differing political, cultural and economic discourses in forming opinions about the 
home country. 
 Furthermore, the Kurds that were interviewed mentioned that they spoke exclusively of 
Kurdistan when they spoke of Iraq. This is in part because their only experience with Iraq has 
been with Kurdistan, which has had autonomous status (although not self-rule) since 1970 and 
was cut off from the rest of Iraq by Saddam Hussein after the first Gulf War. Also, more 
significantly, it is because they identified as Kurdish and not as Iraqi: ―…I don‘t feel connected 
to Iraq. It means nothing to me. For me is Kurdistan important and I want to have a democratic 
and independent Kurdistan.‖217 This is an important goal for many Kurds, who want to establish 
an independent state where the Kurdish culture has been historically based, which covers parts of 
Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Syria. This goal would have a significant impact on 
the rest of Iraq‘s development. Iraqi Kurdistan is the only part of Iraq nowadays that is stable, 
and it has a longer history of autonomy than the rest of Iraq, a number of oil fields, as well as a 
multicultural and multireligious population consisting of Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen, cultures 
that overlap with the confessional groups of Christians, Shi‘as and Sunnis. Therefore its 
separation would have serious social, economic and cultural developmental implications on the 
rest of current-day Iraq.  
While an independent Kurdistan is not a priority for all Kurds, it is a strong tendency 
among those involved in Kurdish organizations. On the other hand, those who did not grow up 
around a large Kurdish community were not exposed to the dominant Kurdish diasporic 
discourse in the same way. A Kurdish woman who grew up in Klagenfurt, Austria expressed 
disappointment when she became involved with the Kurdish community in Vienna: ―It was just 
the discourse I grew up in, nothing new: same people, same things said over thirty, forty years. 
And even the kids my age, the same...I was so happy I grew up in Klagenfurt, far away from all 
these people, because it‘s so different when you actually grow up within your community. No 
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reflection, no critique, nothing.‖218 She found that this group could not see past the old divisions, 
and this limited the discourse about Iraq and about return. For this reason, although she would 
like to return on a more permanent basis, she feels strongly that she would like to work in other 
parts of Iraq or even Syria, in other places that could use her skills. The same issues can be found 
other ethnic and religious communities. While networks offer more opportunities to get involved 
they can also constrain opportunities to those approved by the specific community. 
A lack of a strong connection to a larger network could actually open up new 
opportunities that may not be available otherwise. One Christian Iraqi interviewed had little 
interaction with any Iraqi expatriate community, outside family connections, but had the 
opportunity to go to Iraqi Kurdistan to work on a project improving access to and quality of 
education. He identifies as American, Arab, Christian and Iraqi, but did feel a bond with the 
Kurds: ―I did sense that it was a different country in some ways, but I did also sense that they 
consider themselves part of Iraq.‖ In particular, he noted the positive relations between 
Christians and Kurds, who connect on minority issues, and the positive reactions he received on 
his participation in the project: ―I really sense that there‘s this pride with the people, the Kurds 
we were interacting with, that an Iraqi was coming back to Iraq. [A colleague] sensed that it was 
a really good thing and that it was actually something positive for the project and helped make it 
sort of easier to work with the Kurds that there was an Iraqi was on the project.‖ In this case, his 
orientation outside of a strong community network in the end worked to his advantage. Not only 
was he brought into the project, but there was a positive reaction despite the religious and ethnic 
differences. Therefore, although the different ethnic and religious Iraqi communities in the U.S. 
are fairly separated, as shown in Section 4.1, growing up outside of this can offer new 
opportunities to engage with the home country. 
Another tendency among those interviewed who had lived a long time abroad was that 
while they were in Iraq they spent most of their free time with other Iraqis who had lived as 
expatriates. This is qualitatively different than expatriates that connect with other expatriates 
(either from their own home country or another) while abroad, which could be seen as a general 
trend. In this case, when returning to the home country, they still remain among ―expatriates‖—
other Iraqis who had spent a long period of time abroad or currently continue to live permanently 
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abroad. Although they would have interaction with Iraqi family members or work colleagues, 
they chose to live and make friends with others who had lived abroad. One expatriate explained, 
―Because we share the same stories. Left while we were kids and came back to serve in our 
country. And they are more open minded than the locals.‖219 One woman mentioned the painful 
experience of being called a foreigner (ajnabi) by her family in Iraq. She highlighted the role of 
generational and cultural differences, but also the role of both sides in increasing understanding: 
―If we failed to tell them how we live, then they won‘t get it. But then, on the other hand, they‘re 
like this wall of non acceptance and it‘s so hard to get through it.‖220 The difficulties returnees 
have with the home community increases the longer they‘ve been away, as the mindsets of both 
those who left and those who have stayed change in different ways. Moreover, there is less 
regular contact in the cases of those who had been away longest, and for those who left as 
children. While they still returned to their home country, they did have more difficulties getting 
along with the ―locals‖, a reflection of the gap between the diaspora and the home country. 
Two of the female interviewees cited gender relations as problematic in Iraq, citing 
situations when they were called names or pursued, often to the point of stalking. One of these 
women mentioned these problems as they related to her lack of desire to return to Iraq. As 
discussed in Section 3.2, the current situation in Iraq is not conducive for women to return. This, 
together with feedback from Iraqi women who returned temporarily and the mounting literature 
on women‘s rights in Iraq, underlines the major continuing issues for women in Iraq that make it 
difficult for women to return, even temporarily. 
Finally, a large proportion of those interviewed were Christian, identified through my 
family connections. Not one Christian interviewed expressed a desire to return to Iraq 
permanently: 
…the most important issue there is no future for us as Christians in that country, 
so my decision to move out and leave to save my life and hoping one day in the 
future I can help my family to leave too.
221
 
Here [the U.S.] is safety, everything is available. But Iraq is home. But we cannot 
return—there are not many opportunities and my kids and I would be killed for 
our religion.
222
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For me there is no future there. I‘m living in this country, now I‘m focusing on 
this country.
223
 
For Christians, permanent return is not a feasible option, as they are particularly vulnerable to 
attacks. Furthermore, as Christians leave, it feeds into more emigration, supporting Mygdal‘s 
theory of cumulative causation. But in this case it is not only because networks are created that 
can present opportunities to other Christians, but also because those who remain are even more 
isolated. 
The interviews and the literature on organized return highlight important issues for Iraqi 
expatriates who have made temporary return trips. They give cause to question the assumption 
that expatriates have a unique knowledge and homogeneous opinions of their home country. It 
also means that if diaspora expatriates are engaged, these potential problems must be accounted 
for; creating an integrated framework that harnesses the skills and the potential desire to return 
on the part of the expatriate and linking it with overarching planning that address the needs of the 
home country. In doing so, the projects may be stronger. As Terrazas of MPI notes, ―there are 
benefits from aligning the development priorities of diaspora volunteers with the priorities of 
other actors…In light of their personal ties, diasporas may be more attuned to community-level 
challenges whereas national authorities may have a better appreciation of the macroperspective.‖ 
Development projects that engage expatriates have to account for this and other divergences 
among expatriates and between them and the other actors involved. The differing priorities, 
motivations and goals within the diaspora, as well as among governments, international 
organizations, NGOs, private enterprises and others rarely align with each other, as will be 
shown in the following analysis of Iraqi return schema. 
Furthermore, opportunity structures influenced all parts of the experience of temporary 
return, and these issues continue within organized international programs, to which I now turn. 
Both organized programs discussed here recruited Iraqis for consultancies in a similar time 
period (2005-2007), so dealt with very similar challenges in encouraging development through 
the use of members of the diaspora. Not only did power structures play an important role, but 
during this time in particular, security and sectarian violence presented an enormous challenge. 
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This has an important implication for development as the projects may have been compromised 
by these various challenges, as will be seen in the next section. 
 
5.2 International Programs 
5.2.1 Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq
224
 
The Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq (IRI) program was a ―capacity-building‖ project for the Iraqi 
government, organized among multiple international organizations. It was implemented by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), co-managed by the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP), funded from the UN Director General Trust Fund and coordinated with the 
Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC). It was organized to link the 
requests of various ministries to UN agencies and the IOM for support in capacity-building with 
interest from members of the Iraqi diaspora in various countries to offer their services. Therefore, 
the ―need to identify qualified Iraqi staff from abroad has therefore been recognized to be a top 
priority that needs to be coordinated and integrated into the UN Strategic Plan for programme 
and Capacity building activities for Iraq, through the Poverty Reduction and Human 
Development Cluster‖225 The program‘s goal was to recruit 60 diaspora experts as consultants 
for up to a year on various projects in Iraqi ministries and public institutions. Its development 
objective was to ―contribute to the sustainable recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts 
in post-conflict Iraq by establishing viable mechanisms to bolster the country‘s human resource 
base in the key areas of the public sector.‖226 Its four main objectives were to ―Assist Iraqi 
authorities to identify human resources gaps in key areas of public sector and develop 
professional profiles and eligibility criteria for the posts required to fill these gaps; Identify 
specific skills available among the Iraqi émigré community based on the needs identified by Iraqi 
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public sector authorities; Develop a database and website to serve to establish Iraqi Skills Roster 
and to match the demand and supply of human resources; [and] Deploy and support Iraqi 
expatriate experts to fill identified gaps in the Ministries and other public sector institutions and 
to provide capacity building, professional support and training for existing staff.‖227 IRI had two 
phases: set up and preparation (from September 2004 to February 2005) and project 
implementation, from recruitment to completion of the consultancy (May 2005 to December 31, 
2007).
228
 
In May 2005, the website ―www.iraqi-iri.org‖ was launched by the MoPDC, with the 
support of IOM and the UNDP. The website was offered in three languages (Arabic, Kurdish and 
English) and was the primary coordination point, where interested Iraqi expatriates get 
information about the program, download an application form and submit it online. It was also 
part of a larger information campaign: ―Dozens of Iraqi associations based in neighbouring 
countries as well as in Europe and North America were contacted…The IRI Support Centre in 
Amman started to receive queries and completed application forms from potential candidates and 
in Baghdad the IRI Support Cell had registered over 100 requests from participating ministries 
looking for Iraqi experts.‖229 The website was originally supposed to match potential applicants 
with potential employers, but for technical reasons this was not possible.
230
 In any case, 
recruitment procedure and employment was given much attention, including a ―three level 
filtering system…for the selection of candidates, in order to avoid personal preferences and other 
potential biases.‖231 In conjunction, an Iraqi Skills Roster was developed, to be used in the 
future. Currently, after the completion of the project, the website is no longer operational and in 
fact, to gain information on the program one must contact an array of people at the UNDP and 
IOM, respectively. Furthermore, according to interviews conducted for an independent project 
evaluation, it is not clear if the roster is used.
232
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As far as remuneration: ―IRI experts are provided logistical support for their deployment 
to Iraq, are entitled to a roundtrip air ticket and will receive a compensation fee for their 
services.‖233 However, the MoPDC pushed for lower remuneration for the experts because of 
anticipated friction with Iraqi colleagues: ―Feedback from the focal points proved the MoPDC 
right, as the situation reportedly created some resentment given what was seen as preferential 
treatment to returning Iraqi experts.‖234 On the other hand, 40 percent of experts interviewed for 
the independent project evaluation found the compensation package appealing. While this is a 
large proportion, it was by no means the decisive factor, as ―94% of the experts largely or 
completely agreed that their having an interesting role in rebuilding Iraq was a cause for 
application to the IRI. 76% of the experts largely or completely agreed that the possibility of 
returning to live in Iraq was a reason for their application‖.235 In fact, only 16 percent of those 
who declined the IRI offer cited the compensation package as the reason.
236
 Therefore, in this 
case, lower remuneration (although not as low as those in Iraq are paid) did not hinder the 
recruitment of Iraqi expatriates. 
In the end, the program reached its goal, recruiting 59 experts for 62 assignments (3 
experts were used twice). According to statistics cited by the MoPDC, obtained through a contact 
at IOM Iraq: The majority (29) held PhDs, while 14 held Masters and 19 had a Bachelors degree. 
90 percent of IRI experts were men. Most came from North America and Europe (46: 14 from 
the U.K., 10 from Canada, 8 from Germany, 5 from Sweden, 3 from the Netherlands, 3 from 
France, 2 from Austria and 1 from Italy), but 12 of the remaining 16 experts came from the 
Middle East (6 from Jordan, 3 from the United Arab Emirates, 2 from Qatar, and 1 from 
Lebanon).
237
 Of those recruited, the most prevalent jobs were in medicine, public administration, 
telecommunication and English teaching (in descending order of those recruited). Of those 
requested from the Iraqi side, the jobs of the highest demand were education and training, then 
health/medicine, computer science/web design, civil engineering, and management/leadership (in 
descending order of demand), in addition to a score of others.
238
 Most of the assignments (44) 
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were in Kurdistan (23 in Erbil and 21 in Sulaymaniyah), and 15 assignments were in Baghdad.
239
 
This could be a reflection of the relative stability of Iraqi Kurdistan, or of the strong motivations 
for Kurdish Iraqis to return to work for Kurdish independence. Members of the Kurdish diaspora 
are unlikely to work in other areas of Iraq, as many feel strongly Kurdish rather than Iraqi, and 
work towards an independent Kurdistan rather than towards the development of the current Iraqi 
state. The high percentage of projects focused in Kurdistan means that the developmental impact 
of the IRI program was unevenly spread throughout Iraq, with a greater emphasis on Kurdistan, 
which is already the most stable region of the country. Furthermore, only three assignments were 
outside Baghdad or Kurdistan, largely excluding most regions of Iraq. 
 In the end, although IRI ―appears to have filled a gap‖240, the security situation, in 
addition to outdated equipment, electricity and water cuts, limited resources, issues with staff and 
gender issues were mentioned as severely hindering its effectiveness.
241
 Although it seems that 
some experts continued projects after the completion of their assignment, and even more stated 
intentions to continue working with institutions in Iraq, it is difficult to assess the extent of the 
effects of IRI experts and the program in general. The independent external project evaluation 
found that:  
The project was designed without a very clear idea of what could realistically be 
achieved given the prevailing context in Iraq at the time. It was essentially a pilot 
project to gauge the level and commitment of the government to be involved in 
such an endeavor and the willingness of experts to return. Therefore the project 
design did not fully spell out the details of the process. It did not specifically 
address the issue of the type of return that was foreseen under the project.
242
  
However, it did refer to the more permanent return projects in Afghanistan, and so hoped for 
potential permanent returns of expatriates, or at least a long-term engagement. In fact, nine of the 
59 experts stayed, at least six of whom accepted jobs with the Government of Iraq.
243
 The high 
percentage of assignments in Kurdistan, along with the strong desire on the part of many Kurdish 
Iraqi expatriates to return to Kurdistan and work towards independence could be linked to the 
return of nine of the IRI experts. The only interviewee contacted for this thesis who returned 
permanently was a Kurdish woman who grew up in Vienna, Austria, but whose family is from 
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Sulaymaniyah. She was involved in the Kurdish community in Vienna, and believes strongly in 
an independent Kurdistan. She had already planned to return after finishing her university thesis, 
but returned immediately when an opportunity in Erbil arose. This example of permanent return 
connects the bond with and participation in the Kurdish community in Austria, whose politics 
stress an independent Kurdistan, with the opportunities for return. This case, together with the 
permanent return of nine expatriates from the IRI program, suggests that not only must there be 
the opportunity to return, but also larger factors, such as a strong desire to return and 
participation in a community that encourages it. 
In the end, the IRI program goal was reached despite the fact that the political and 
security situation was unstable, at best. The program realized its immediate objectives of 
assisting Iraqi authorities in identifying human resource gaps, identifying skills in the Iraqi 
expatriate community, developing a database and a website, and sending Iraqi expatriates on 
assignment in Iraq. It did this while taking into account possible issues of remuneration and 
favoritism in the recruitment process. Due to security issues, the program was managed 
remotely. The situation in the country was already dangerous at the start of the program, with 
international organizations withdrawing from Iraq on the 22 September 2003, but the bombing of 
the Shi‘a mosque Askariya in February 2006 led to increasing sectarian violence, directly 
challenging the work of this program. Indeed, security was highlighted as the most important 
constraint of the project. 35 percent of those who declined the offer to work with the IRI program 
cited security as the reason.
244
 This, along with strong Kurdish nationalism, is probably one of 
the reasons why most projects are focused in the relatively stable Kurdistan. At the same time, it 
should be noted that many Iraqi Arabs have come to Kurdistan to benefit from the stable 
environment and access to services—especially education, which the IRI program in Kurdistan 
did work to develop. In conclusion, the IRI program did fulfill its immediate objectives, despite 
serious constraints, but its lack of follow-through after the fact has limited its impact. The IRI 
program‘s engagement with Iraq ended in 2007 when the program officially ended, which is 
reflected in the absence of a working website, no attempt to prolong the program‘s activities and 
limited feedback from the MoPDC. 
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5.2.2 Local Governance Program Phase One
245
 
The Iraqi Local Governance Program (LGP) is funded by the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and implemented by Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International, a 
research institution based in the Research Triangle in North Carolina, U.S. Its immediate 
objective at Phase One was the ―the restoration of basic public services and support to local 
administrations with service delivery responsibility‖246, with the long-term objective ―to 
establish subnational government structures and procedures that would assure responsive and 
transparent local services, while putting in place democratic governance mechanisms—elected 
councils, as well as neighborhood, city, and provincial levels—that would support the 
empowerment of local authorities and citizens.‖247 The program is currently on its third phase, 
beginning January 1, 2009 and due to be ending June 30, 2011, focusing mostly on support of the 
local councils which by now have been trained and are Iraqi-led. LGP3 has not used diaspora 
Iraq professionals (DIPs) and other Iraqi expatriates as was done in previous phases. DIPs were 
Iraqi expatriates recruited for assignments in Iraq. LGP1 (from 2003 to 2005) and LGP2 (from 
2005 to 2008), used twelve and 32 DIPs, respectively, as consultants to work on the restoration 
of public services and support local administrations; they were an integral part of the program. 
However, RTI also recruited expatriates to work on the project, at its peak in January/February 
2004 hiring more than 230 expatriate professionals.
248
  
 Brinkerhoff, a member of a LGP policy advisory group, and Taddesse, who was posted to 
Iraq through the LGP, outlined the use of twelve DIPs by LGP1 from personal experience with 
the program, interviews with RTI recruiters and managers and surveys of DIPs. Their study 
focused on the important impact of the LGP in forming 437 neighborhood (hayy) councils, 195 
sub-district (nahiya) councils, 96 district (qada) councils and 16 provincial (mouhafadhat) 
councils, and the role of DIPs in the program‘s fruitfulness. LGP1 trained over 20,000 council 
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members, held 22,000 events across Iraq and reached more than 750,000 people across the 
country.
249
 It trained managers, organized national and regional conferences, as well as a score of 
other events, encouraged civil society work, worked on the political awareness campaign for the 
first elections after the CPA and hired more than 3,000 Iraqis as staff in the country. DIPs were 
used within this program in various ways; of the twelve DIPs, eight were civil-society specialists 
(although one was hired as an urban planner), two engineers worked on public service delivery 
and infrastructure issues, one worked as a public administration specialist and trainer (and 
continued working under LGP2), and one was the national information technology director for 
LGP (and continued working under LGP2).
250
  
 Brinkerhoff and Taddesse highlight the importance of the DIP‘s language and cultural 
knowledge of Iraq as well as personal connections to the community to their job effectiveness. 
The quick acceptance and start-up for RTI activities are attributed to DIPs who:  
were able to transmit knowledge of international best practices, relate them to the 
situation in Iraq, and engage their counterparts in discussions about application to 
Iraq. They could get into the heart of sensitive issues such as ethical codes, 
corruption, and transparency that would be difficult for others to do without 
bruising Iraqi pride…Being from Iraq provided an immediate bond, and helped to 
establish trust, mutual respect, and commitment. It also helped in understanding 
the meaning and subtleties of hand gestures, facial expressions, and other bodily 
movements, which form part of the spoken language, but for which there are no 
equivalent Arabic words…The DIPs were able to convey the purpose of the 
program and content of the message in precise terms, using relevant examples 
relating to Iraq‘s past.251 
Thus, DIPs in LGP1 were integral to the success of the project. In particular, their cultural 
knowledge has been emphasized as a lubricant for the LGP.  
However, ―their deep understanding of the underlying social fabric and power relations at 
all levels of Iraqi society, and the rapport they were able to establish with local actors‖252 may be 
overstated. While the bond of being a fellow Iraqi is strong, as I have also experienced in 
meeting other Iraqis, the use of DIPs within LGP1 did contribute to several important issues with 
the local population. First, as was discussed in Section 5.1, this assumes expatriates‘ continued 
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intimate knowledge of the language and culture, which may not be the case. In multiple 
interviews conducted for this thesis, including with one DIP who returned through the LGP, 
returnees mentioned that they generally did not mix with local Iraqis (save for family members, 
or when they had to interact with local Iraqis for work matters). This was because they were 
identified as foreign by locals, and the expatriate community is viewed as ―more open-minded.‖ 
At the same time, this trend may also reflect an individual feeling of difference on the part of the 
expatriate. They tended to mix exclusively with other expatriates, in part because they identified 
more with other expatriates, in part because they were disparaged by locals. In fact, the lives of 
expatriates temporarily returning to Iraq for consultancies are very different from locals‘ lives. 
The LGP DIP that was interviewed for this thesis mentioned:  
I lived with expats and worked with Iraqis. My residence was in a secure 
compound in Mosul and a secure compound in Baghdad in the IZ. Due to the pace 
of the work and my short visits, confined living situation did not affect me too 
much since I had little time to be bothered by it. I was also so very inspired by my 
Iraqi colleagues who live in far dangerous circumstances than I do and always 
manage to show up to work on time and with a zest for their work.
253
 
While there is clear admiration on the part of the DIP, there is also a significant gap between 
local Iraqis and expatriates, which can be attributed to the time spent abroad by the latter. While 
expatriates still identify as Iraqi and believe they know the culture well, on a basic level they do 
not associate with local Iraqis when they are actually in the country, unless the situation requires 
it. This challenges the idea that expatriates know the Iraqi culture best, if they are categorized or 
categorize themselves as different. 
Second, aside from the tensions arising from disparate salaries, LGP DIPs were often 
accused of being traitors or collaborators, especially as they were Iraqi-American.
254
 Although 
often unfounded, this does present an important limitation, especially to the projects this program 
spearheaded. Organizations and activities created or supported by an international program have 
at times been shunned by local Iraqis, as has been noted in the case of women‘s centers in Iraq 
that were funded by the Coalition Provisional Authority: ―…many Iraqi women were afraid to 
attend the centres, which were associated with the occupation, and often regarded with suspicion, 
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if not as a target for insurgents, by the respective local communities.‖255 This is especially 
important when considering the time period of LGP1 and LGP2, which spanned a period of 
increasing insurgency and violence in Iraq. If Iraqis are afraid to use the services offered by an 
international program, the program‘s developmental impact is hindered.  
Third, ethnic and religious differences played a large role. Surprisingly, about 40 percent 
of DIPs voiced no preference to be assigned to their ethnic area, where their family line was 
well-known.
256
 However, for the 60 percent that did show this preference, when they were not 
sent to this area, some showed resentment. Much more disturbing is the fact that when DIPs were 
assigned near their home communities, they tended to hire Iraqis only from their own ethnic 
group. In fact, according to Brinkerhoff and Taddesse, ―several of the surveyed DIPs suggested 
that to some degree a few of the DIPs abused their discretionary hiring power to establish small 
but effective ‗fiefdoms‘…some had a small army of drivers and bodyguards, partly as protection 
and partly as a demonstration of status and power.‖257 Furthermore, there were divisions among 
the DIPs along ethnic and religious lines. This highlights the important fact that not only are 
there issues between returnees and Iraqis, but also among returnees. As seen in the interviews 
and the literature, there is distrust between expatriates, which can lead to problems if they are 
expected to work together. A Christian expatriate now living in the U.S. interviewed for this 
thesis expressed strong distrust of Iraqi Muslims: ―I take care in dealing with them. I know what 
they do, from my experience in Iraq. I deal with them and respect them as a person, and help 
when they need it because I‘m a Christian. But we are surface friends and it is not deep.‖ In the 
case of the LGP, the structure of the Iraqi-American community and the distrust among various 
sects and ethnicities had a strong influence; the divisiveness of the Iraqi-American communities, 
especially along religious and ethnic lines, manifested itself in the use of these DIPs in the 
program. The lack of a system of checks on the recruiting of local Iraqis by DIPs, combined with 
the ethnic and religious issues strongly related to the Iraqi-American community, led to an abuse 
of power, and may have discouraged Iraqis without the same ethnic or religious background 
from getting involved. Therefore, it may have encouraged divisiveness along religious and ethnic 
lines within Iraq, hindering the very political development it hoped to promote. 
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Despite these significant issues with the use of DIPs, the focused goal along with 
widespread activities of the LGP did bring important results to Iraq. In particular, members of 
the diaspora ―used their skills to teach, facilitate, and mobilize the Iraqis they collaborated 
with.‖258 DIPs were used in a strictly temporary sense; they were mobilized to build capacity in 
Iraq, so Iraqis could fulfill the jobs themselves, without the continued help of members of the 
diaspora. In fact, if one observes how the LGP program has evolved, DIPs have gradually been 
phased out of the program, so that now, by LGP3, the program is Iraqi-led. In this sense, the 
temporary and small-scale use of DIPs within the LGP was successful, despite issues during 
LGP1. 
 
5.3 Individually-organized Return Migration  
In comparison to the previous programs, individually-organized engagement does not operate 
under the same structures, but it does evoke similar issues with Iraqis in Iraq. The temporary 
return migration of Iraqi businesspeople, in this case primarily from neighboring countries, fits 
within the category of ―transnational circuits‖, as defined by Faist: 
Transnational circuits are characterized by a constant circulation of goods, people, 
and information transversing the borders of sending and receiving states… along 
with principle of exchange, viz. instrumental reciprocity. Often, economic 
entrepreneurs use insider advantages such as knowledge of the language, knowing 
friends and acquaintances abroad to establish a foothold.
259
 
These migrants constantly move between the sending and the receiving states, to simultaneously 
take advantage of markets, educational opportunities, medical availability, a safe haven, etc. 
Many of these entrepreneurs and their families are established in one country ―and use it as a sort 
of base from which to carry out entrepreneurial activities in others.‖260 These transnational 
circuits are increasingly noticeable in the Iraqi case. A growing amount of literature, spearheaded 
by Chatelard, examines the role of Iraqis living primarily in Jordan and Syria and working in 
Iraq. This concept of ―re-engagement‖261 involves doctors, university professors, members of 
government (it is argued that around half of the outgoing parliament and government have 
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houses in Amman),
262
 business people and civil society members (especially heads of NGOs and 
women‘s organizations), who combine access to income in Iraq with the security of living 
outside of the country. Chatelard has interviewed a number of Iraqis who have maintained or 
restarted businesses in Iraq from Amman—NGOs, architect firms, etc. In addition, one of Al-
Ali‘s interviewees highlights the benefits of living in Amman while working in Iraq: ―My father 
still lives in Iraq. He goes back and forth. He has a green card. He is a lawyer and has a law firm. 
He does most of the work from here. It is almost useless to be in Baghdad, because even if you 
have to go to court, there are many obstacles, like curfews.‖263 He moves back and forth between 
Jordan and Iraq to maintain an income, and perhaps to access certain services available in 
Jordan. Chatelard notes that there is a lot of business going on between Damascus or Aleppo and 
Iraq, with recently arrived Iraqis, journalists, artists and intellectuals playing a big role in cross-
border interaction and trade: ―Iraqi intellectuals in Jordan and Syria have more access to 
resources, social networks, cultural productions and more opportunities for interaction with 
foreign intellectuals than their colleagues who have remained in Iraq.‖264 In Amman and 
Damascus they can have comfortable living conditions and security as well as access to 
education, services and a larger intellectual community. The concept of ―Arab brotherhood‖ 
discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 on Iraqi migration to Syria and Jordan offers a unique 
opportunity for Iraqis to gain access to health and education services in the neighboring host 
countries. For Iraqi businesses and research centers especially, Amman, Kurdistan and Beirut 
have served as centers:  
They manage responses to call for research proposals and the production of 
reports, receive payments from the organizations that commission the reports, 
generally in North America and Western Europe, and remunerate researchers 
spread across several locations in the Middle East. Whereas field-researchers 
gather data inside Iraq, keeping a low public profile and maintaining networks of 
protection in their respective communities, more prominent Iraqi social scientists 
located outside Iraq devise research methodologies and write up reports.
265
 
In these cases, Iraqis cross borders frequently—maintaining businesses in one country 
and returning to the other as needed. Iraqis in the region have ―re-engaged‖ with Iraq on a 
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very different level from those organized by international programs. Their location 
abroad accords them safety and access to education and services such as electricity or 
healthcare while they simultaneously interact with their home country. As concerns Iraq, 
their proximity to the country allows them to engage on a more regular basis in order to 
retain connections, open or keep up businesses, gather information, or even maintain 
legitimacy as ―Iraqi‖.  
However, as highlighted in Section 4.5 on the Iraqi community in Jordan, freedom of 
movement is limited, as Iraqis may not be allowed back into Jordan without a residence permit 
or a Western passport. In Al-Ali‘s example of the Iraqi lawyer going back and forth between 
Jordan and Iraq, this is only made possible because he holds a green card. Without this, return is 
too risky, if one is not planning on staying in Iraq. These residence permits are very difficult to 
obtain, and are largely restricted to the higher classes and those with specialized skills considered 
essential in Jordan. In Syria residence permits are easier to acquire, but crossing the border to 
Iraq is still a risk. Moreover, aside from the issue of a residency status, if an Iraqi does have a job 
in Amman or Damascus, they are unlikely to leave their job for a month or more, as this may 
challenge their work status. 
Furthermore, there is considerable suspicion within Iraq about the diaspora, and those 
who maintain a double residence or move back and forth (even to visit family) try not to 
publicize it in Iraq.
266
 There is a large amount of resentment and critique of members of the 
diaspora who ―did not live it‖ and ―did not see it.‖ Many Iraqis who did not leave view diaspora 
activities as patronizing or out of touch, and associate the diaspora with the 2003 invasion and 
subsequent occupation: ―…in the Iraqi context where, for a variety of reasons, influential figures 
from the diaspora have played a disproportionate role in the new Iraqi leadership supported by 
the U.S. Diaspora women have tried to put their mark on emerging women‘s organizations and 
on the contestation of citizenship within Iraq, but have frequently been perceived as being 
patronizing or being part of a ‗western plot‘.‖267 It is true that Iraqi expatriates have played an 
enormous role in post-2003 Iraq—even Ayad Allawi and Nouri al-Maliki, the largest recipients 
of the popular vote in the most recent elections, spent most of their time abroad, living in the 
U.K., Syria and Iran. In order to gain support, though, they must recast themselves as critics of 
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the U.S. invasion and, in some cases, pander to sectarian divisions, tribal connections and 
powerful militias. In any case, those who have returned (either temporarily or permanently) must 
hide their connections abroad to gain legitimacy among the general Iraqi population. 
This suspicion is not only on the part of Iraqi citizens, but also the government, which has 
not made large-scale efforts towards engaging those who left more recently. In December 2008, 
the government hosted the first conference in Baghdad looking to attract Iraqi expatriates back to 
Iraq. About 200 Iraqi professionals participated, but most of the attendees had left in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and not post-2003.
268
 This is mainly due to the view of those having left post-2003 as 
Ba‘thist sympathizers: 
One possible reading of the reluctance of Premier Nuri al-Maliki and most 
members of his government—the majority of whom lived in exile in Iran, Syria 
and elsewhere, some of them since the 1970s—to take any meaningful step 
towards engaging with those who have taken refuge abroad since 2003 is their 
belief that forced exile is a deserved punishment or, alternatively, that refugees 
are traitors who refuse to adhere to the political project of the so-called new Iraq. 
In this conceptualization, those newly exiled are paying the price for having 
caused—if only by having failed to be sufficiently active in their opposition to 
Saddam Hussein—the exile of those who are in power today.269 
This means that opportunities are limited for those who left more recently and still want to 
engage with Iraq. While those who left immediately following the 2003 invasion did tend to be 
Ba‘thist sympathizers, starting in 2005 and 2006 Iraqis from all backgrounds were fleeing the 
violence that had erupted around the country. The Iraqi government‘s reluctance is why most of 
the ―re-engagement‖ going on from Jordan and Syria tends to involve those having left more 
recently; recruitment by the Iraqi government and international programs (often coordinated with 
the Iraqi government) tends to focus on those having left pre-2003. Although the Iraqis 
Rebuilding Iraq program did recruit several Iraqis from the Middle East, the majority of Iraqis 
recruited from the diaspora to work as consultants in Iraq came from North America, Europe or 
Australia. This characteristic suggests that these consultants left before 2003, as these regions 
have not accepted large numbers of Iraqi refugees post-2003, in comparison with neighboring 
countries. Furthermore, of those they did accept, it is unlikely that they would achieve the 
volunteer requirements required by international programs (i.e. education, top of the field, access 
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to state of the art technology) to return as expatriate professionals. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that those arriving via recruitment for consultancies tend to have left before 2003, and in fact, 
probably before 1991, while those involved in ―re-engagement‖ activities may include a 
proportion of those who have more recently left. 
While this new form of movement, ―re-engagement‖, is important to illuminate the 
various forms of exchange Iraqis abroad are having with Iraq, there are important limitations, not 
least of which is a lack of numbers to put this movement into perspective. Indeed, none of the 
temporary returnees interviewed for this thesis fit within this scheme of individually-organized 
return for professional purposes. However, it presents an alternative form of temporary return 
that engages more of those who have left recently. Furthermore, it can have an important 
developmental impact as many of these returnees are engaged in small and medium-sized 
businesses, civil society activities and research organizations within Iraq. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This section has outlined a few different types of Iraqi temporary return migration and their 
characteristics, showing that return has multiple forms. Each was coordinated by different 
entities: international organizations, governments, and through personal initiative. And in turn, 
they each have brought something to Iraq, through the return of skills, especially channeled 
towards infrastructure and government activities. Each has its own benefits and drawbacks and, 
in fact, there can be advantages in combining different forms. As an MPI report has highlighted: 
―diasporas may have a better understanding of local needs whereas foreign aid agencies and 
national governments may have a broader perspective—working together can achieve some 
alignment of objectives and better allocation of resources.‖270 Diaspora- or individually-led 
forms of re-engagement can gain a broader structure from government- or international-led 
programs, and the reverse is true for integrating local needs into programs. At the same time, 
interaction may not be sustainable (as in the case of IRI) or targeted enough. These temporary 
returns will not necessarily lead to permanent return. In fact, the longer these professionals are 
abroad, the less likely they are to return.
271
 Not only is the situation in Iraq not conducive to 
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permanent return of professionals, but they may be well-established in their host communities, 
with a high standard of living, integrated children and a career path. In this case, temporary, 
circular and virtual migration are all ways to engage Iraqi diaspora professionals on a short-term 
basis while they live abroad. 
 On the other hand, the engagement of members of the diaspora has had clear problems: 
resentment, abuse of power, divisions among returnees and detachment from those who had not 
left being just a few. The interviews and the analysis of various forms of temporary return 
highlight important issues for Iraqi expatriates who have made temporary return trips. While 
religion and ethnicity play an important role in motivations for return, distance from larger Iraqi 
expatriate communities can offer alternative possibilities for engagement with Iraq. The 
interviews particularly showed the importance of identity and the exposure to different political, 
cultural and economic discourses for forming opinions about the home country. The differences 
created by exposure to different discourses created a disparity between those Iraqis who stayed 
and those who lived abroad, as many of the temporary return migrants felt disconnected from the 
home community when they returned. Moreover, in each of the interviews conducted, as well as 
the forms of temporary return reviewed, power structures emerged within the context of their 
temporary return migration: religion, ethnicity, citizenship, and gender all played a particular 
role in the interactions among the returnees and between returnees and local Iraqis. As concerns 
consultancies within specific development programs, these differences within the diaspora 
converged with the various goals and motivations of governments and international 
organizations, which may or may not align with the other actors involved. All of these factors 
influenced opportunities and motivations to return on the part of expatriates, as well as actions 
within an international development program. 
Each form of temporary return discussed above has been unique based on its participants. 
Moreover, the possibility for return has been affected by the opportunity structures available in 
the host country and the features of the networks to which the migrant belongs (ethnic, religious, 
gendered, etc). These characteristics have important consequences on development programs 
using diaspora professionals, most especially its reception by and engagement of the home 
community. Thus, steps should be taken to reduce the negative effects that have been outlined 
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when engaging diaspora professionals, for example through multiple screenings of applicants for 
consultancies, integrating non-diaspora members into consultancies and into the program on a 
larger scale, monitoring returnees who have been sent to their specific home community or 
region, and increased engagement of those who have left more recently. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
Existing literature on diaspora engagement and development in the home country has illuminated 
the diverse effects that different diasporas can have on home countries. The diversity of effects 
can be seen as a result of the diverse reasons for return. In the Iraqi case, the existing divisions 
within the Iraqi diaspora create different forms, opportunities and motivations for engagement, 
creating a host of answers to the question: Why do Iraqis return? These divisions are based on 
religious, gendered, social, economic and regional differences, as well as experience of 
emigration and the opportunity structures in host countries. All these factors create differences 
between Iraqi expatriates and Iraqi locals, and can explain the feeling of distance mentioned on 
the part of Iraqi expatriates who returned. Furthermore, when skilled expatriates are recruited as 
consultants within development projects these differences combine with the different goals and 
motivations put forth by governments, international organizations and other actors involved. 
When Iraqi skilled expatriates return temporarily to their home country for professional reasons, 
either through a consultancy or personal initiative, the power structures involved have a 
significant role, influencing where, with whom and why expatriates engage. While the return of 
skills is important for Iraq, temporary return has also had unintended consequences, especially in 
the encouragement of divisions along confessional or ethnic lines. Therefore, it is important to 
keep these complexities in mind when engaging members of the diaspora in development plans: 
Iraqis return based on the congruence of a multitude of factors and thus have various motivations 
to take into account. As one interviewee for this study highlighted, when discussing his reasons 
for return, ―It was something that came in that I found out about and got interested in…It was 
totally a natural fit…having an Iraqi background and speaking Arabic…So there was something 
going on, and it was a good fit for my professional and practical experience.‖272 Ethnicity, 
interest, experience and last but not least, chance: all came together to guide this one person‘s 
return, and can be used to analyze all forms of return migration. 
While these differences seem to present a large obstacle to collaboration across ethnic or 
religious lines within the diaspora, it has not appeared to prevent women inside Iraq from 
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working together.
273
 This seems to suggest that the divisions within the diaspora are stronger 
than those among Iraqis in Iraq. In this case, it could be more effective to engage local civil 
society actors than those from abroad, especially considering the disconnect between expatriates 
and local Iraqis. On the other hand, certain Iraqi diaspora activities have had a positive effect on 
Iraq: the IRI program established a database and website to match human resource needs with 
the diaspora; the LGP employed 3,000 local Iraqis, created neighborhood, sub-district, district 
and provincial councils, and trained 20,000 council members; and individually-organized 
temporary return migration has encouraged small- and medium-sized businesses, civil society 
activities and research organizations within Iraq.  
Thus, this study has shown that diaspora engagement clearly has diverse results, even 
within a diaspora and one home country. However, it has only answered part of the question: 
Why do Iraqis return to Iraq? Its focus on temporary return migration for professional reasons 
over the last seven years has highlighted the diverse opportunities, motivations and expectations 
within the diaspora, built over the course of fifty years. However, some of these trends may be a 
result of inter-confessional and inter-ethnic relations over the course of hundreds of years, a time 
period that could not be covered in this thesis. Furthermore, there is currently little research 
available on the return of skilled Iraqi expatriates for professional reasons; tangible numbers are 
needed on how many Iraqis return within this formula, what work do they do and where in Iraq 
they go. More research is needed on how to encourage development without the unintended 
consequences that could hinder development. While it is clear that offering lower remuneration 
to expatriates helps the cooperation between expatriates and locals, more needs to be studied 
within the Iraqi context. For example, virtual return of skills, using the internet to share 
information between skilled Iraqi expatriates and professionals and/or academics in Iraq could be 
a way to tap diaspora skills while avoiding some of the issues involved in actual return.  
Furthermore, a comparative study with other regions or countries would help illuminate 
the uniqueness of the Iraqi case or global trends. There are multiple actors involved in each 
country and within each diaspora, but how much of the Iraqi case is relevant to these other cases? 
Why, for example, have members of the Afghan diaspora returned permanently on a larger scale 
than in Iraq? There are clearly various factors at work motivating Afghans to return, but how do 
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they differ from Iraqis?  
This thesis may provoke more questions than answers. But it is a foray into an important 
discussion that needs to occur. Diaspora engagement has received much more attention lately, 
either for its negative impacts (e.g. Somalia) or its positive impacts (e.g. China and India). Many 
home country governments, especially the Philippines and India, are implementing programs to 
encourage expatriates to return, to set up businesses or to send money to the home country. 
These programs need to account for the variety of opportunities, motivations and expectations at 
play that encourage engagement with the home country, and analyze how they perhaps differ 
from the government‘s own goals. The Iraqi case has shown that a diaspora cannot be viewed as 
homogeneous, and therefore, diaspora engagement has multiple results, both positive and 
negative. Iraq‘s history is unique, and its recent history and current situation present an enormous 
challenge to development. Moreover, the diaspora already played a role in the 2003 invasion. 
Despite this, perhaps there is still a positive part the Iraqi diaspora can play to encourage Iraqi 
development. For this to happen, however, differences (and not just confessional or ethnic) must 
be recognized and managed.  
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Annex 
 
Table 1: Interviewees Data 
 
Date of 
Interview 
Date of 
Emigration Ethnicity Education or Profession Religion 
Host 
Country
274 
Reason for 
Return 
20.02.2010 2009 Arab M.A., teacher Christian U.S. (Syria) personal 
20.02.2010 2009 Arab High school certificate Christian U.S. (Syria) personal 
20.02.2010 2009 Arab Civil engineer Shi‗a U.S. 
Danish 
Refugee 
Organization 
15.05.2010 1991 Kurd M.A. Sunni Austria NGO 
26.05.2010 1986 Kurd M.A. Poli Sci, Uni Wien Sunni 
Austria 
(Iran) 
personal, 
Austrian 
Airways job 
20.06.2010 1980 Arab 
PhD, International 
Development 
professional 
Christian 
U.S. 
(Kuwait) 
nonprofit org 
21, 30.07.2010 2007. Arab Translator Christian U.S. (Jordan) 
US 
government 
12.08.2010 2006 Arab Translator 
Not 
religious 
Egypt 
(Syria) 
personal 
02.09.2010 1979 Arab 
International 
Development 
professional 
Muslim 
family 
U.S. LGP Program 
18.09.2010 2006 Arab High school certificate 
Not 
religious 
Egypt 
(Jordan) 
personal 
                                                 
274
 The countries in parentheses represent the first host country for the migrant, from which they migrated to their 
current host country. 
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2. Sample Survey 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
Thank you so much for agreeing to answer a few questions on your return migration to Iraq, this 
survey should take 20-25 minutes. I will be conducting research until August for my Master's 
thesis in Global Studies for the University of Vienna, which studies return migration and Iraqi 
development. This interest stems from my father and his family's experiences migrating from 
Iraq. I am a second generation immigrant, my father having immigrated to the US in the late 
1970s. I would really appreciate your responses to these questions, and please feel free to 
elaborate as much as possible. All answers will be anonymous, and I will keep all the 
information I receive protected. You may also respond in either French or English. 
 
1. How old are you? Where were you born? What is your nationality? 
 
2. Are you religious? 
 
3. Are you politically active? 
 
4. Did you study in Iraq? (high school, university, post-graduate) If so, what did you study? 
 
5. When did you leave Iraq? Where did you go? 
 
6. Why did you go to this destination, and how did you get there? 
 
7. Why did you leave Iraq? 
 
8. Did you obtain citizenship from your host country? Why or why not? 
 
9. Do you study or work in your host country? If so, what do you do? 
 
10. Are you involved in an Iraqi community in your host country? 
 
11. What do you like best about your host country? What do you dislike? 
 
12. Have you returned to Iraq or a neighboring country? If so, why? (If the answer is no, 
please disregard question #13) 
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13. In Iraq did you spend most of your time in an expatriate community or with ―locals‖?  
How did they respond to your time abroad? 
 
14. What do you think the first priority of the government should be to encourage 
development? Why? 
 
15. Do you stay in contact with those in Iraq? How and how often? (i.e. Skype, facebook, 
email, etc) Are these family or work contacts? 
 
16. What do you miss from Iraq? Do you see yourself moving back permanently? 
 
 
 
THANK YOU for your time!
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3. Pictures
275
 
 
 
Iraqi translators and military working with American military during the January 2009 elections. 
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 I have tried to identify the holders of image rights and obtain their consent for the use of images reproduced here. 
However, should I unintentionally violate copyrights, I request that messages be sent to me. 
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meetings. 
 Wrote and edited newsletter articles for circulation to all Education Abroad Program students. 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA CAMPUS REPRESENTATIVE, University of Lyon, August 2006 – August 
2007 
Lyon, France 
 Recruited students at the University of Lyon, and the Political Science Institute to study abroad at the 
University of California. 
 Helped French students through the exchange program application process. 
 
Languages: English: Native language; French: Fluent; German: B 1/2 level, conversant. 
 
Technical Skills: Technically proficient in Microsoft Office Suite, Photoshop, InDesign, Lotus Notes and 
Filemaker Pro. 
 
 
